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Abstract
This thesis examines four distinct facets and methods for understanding political
ideology, and so it includes four distinct chapters with only moderate connections
between them. Chapter 2 examines how reactions to emotional stimuli vary with
political opinion, and how the stimuli can produce changes in an individual’s po-
litical preferences. Chapter 3 examines the connection between self-reported fear
and item nonresponse on surveys. Chapter 4 examines the connection between
political and moral consistency with low-dimensional ideology, and Chapter 5 de-
velops a technique for estimating ideal points and salience in a low-dimensional
ideological space.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Following this introduction, this thesis is broken into four distinct chapters. Chap-
ter 2 examines how reactions to emotional stimuli vary with political opinion, and
how the stimuli can produce changes in an individual’s political preferences. Ralph
Adolphs and R. Michael Alvarez wrote portions of the first chapter, but I performed
the experiment and analyses.
Chapter 3 examines the connection between self-reported fear and item nonre-
sponse on surveys. This project is a collaboration with Laura Loesch, R. Michael
Alvarez, and Lonna Atkeson. Preliminary analyses, modeling ideas, and introduc-
tory text were produced by my collaborators, but I performed all the analyses and
results reported here.
Chapter 4 examines the connection between political and moral consistency
with low-dimensional ideology, and Chapter 5 develops a technique for estimating
ideal points and salience in a low-dimensional ideological space. Both of these
chapters are entirely my own.
2Chapter 2
The effect of emotional priming on survey
responses
Decades of research in political science have assumed that experiences are filtered
and processed by a variety of psychological mechanisms to form political attitudes
and determine behavior (Campbell et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1978; Jennings and Niemi,
2009). This general causal framework is applied to studies of partisanship and
ideology (Campbell et al., 1960), policy opinions (Alvarez and Brehm, 1998, 2002),
or participation and candidate choice (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995, 1998; Alvarez et
al., 2000; Brady, 1985; Fiorina, 1978; Verba et al., 1995). Only quite recently has
research begun to explore the extent to which political attitudes and behavior,
and the related psychological mechanisms, might have underlying genetic bases or
might be associated with physiological factors (Alford et al., 2005, 2009; Fowler
and Dawes, 2008; Mattes et al., 2010; Spezio et al., 2008).
In an important report, Oxley, Smith, et al. (Oxley et al., 2008, hereafter
OS) published findings that individuals who favored more socially protective poli-
cies like opposition to same-sex marriage and support for the Patriot Act had
stronger physiological responses to surprising and threatening stimuli. These find-
ings supported the interpretation that social policy attitudes are connected to the
mechanisms that control reactions to emotional stimuli. However, while the OS
report received significant attention, it has not been subjected to replication or
extension.
3As part of a larger research project, we replicated the OS protocol (stimuli and
methods) but obtained completely different results. We also used an improved
protocol that used a larger set of well-characterized images, randomized the stim-
ulus order, and used a metric for skin conductance response that is less influenced
by earlier responses. OS argued, on the basis of their original findings, that con-
servative subjects tended to react more strongly to threatening stimuli than did
liberal subjects, but our data do not support this conclusion. In this study, liberal
subjects had significantly stronger skin conductance responses across all types of
emotional stimuli, and there was little variation across stimulus types in the reac-
tions of liberals versus conservatives. We extend the physiological measurements
to include respiratory sinus arrhythmia, for which we observe emotional category-
specific differences between the groups, which could signal differences in emotion
regulation. Finally, the results from the image stimuli are shown to carry over to
emotion-inducing video stimuli.
2.1 Results
Subjects came to the lab for two sessions. In the first session, they completed a
variety of political and psychological questionnaires and then viewed a series of
emotional images and a video. In the second session a few months later, they
completed the OS protocol and then viewed a different set of emotional images
and a video. The images and videos were classified to induce fear, disgust, or
be neutral positive, and subjects were randomly assigned to treatments in each
session. Details of the experiment and stimuli are in the Methods section and
Supplemental Information section at the end of this chapter.
2.1.1 Replication of OS protocol
To replicate OS as closely as possible, we obtained the exact images and the fixed
presentation order used in OS from the authors, and we displayed the images for 20
seconds each with 10 second blank screens between images, just as in the original
4experiment. Following the analysis of OS, we took the log of skin conductance
and subtracted the mean in the 10 second gap preceding an image from the mean
during the 20 second image presentation to get a skin conductance response for each
individual to each image. We then averaged this mean response for each individual
across the three threatening images and the three non-threatening images.
To parallel OS, we classified subjects as having high and low levels of support
based on whether they were above or below the median in their support for ‘socially
protective policies’ measured using the same Wilson-Patterson (WP) battery as
OS, which had subjects report whether they agree or disagree with a list of policies.
This battery was collected from subjects during the first session, meaning that as
in OS, our subjects waited a few months after completing the WP battery before
we measured their skin conductance responses to the OS images. We grouped
some of the WP answers into a single metric of support for socially protective
policies as described in the OS supplemental materials. Fig. 2.1 compares the log
skin conductance responses between our high- and low-support groups for both
threatening and non-threatening images, and the corresponding results from OS
are also displayed for comparison.
In OS, subjects with high support for socially protective policies had stronger
reactions to the threatening images than subjects with low support, and on non-
threatening images, skin conductances were similar across the two groups. In our
sample, the group with high support for protective policies has slightly stronger
(not statistically significant) reactions to threatening images, but showed a much
stronger reaction to non-threatening images than those with low support. Note
that because the populations are different and high and low support for protective
policies are defined around the median level of support, our high- and low-support
groups are somewhat different from those in OS. OS’s subjects were selected for
high levels of participation, and so they had very few subjects near the middle of
the scale, so most of their subjects would be classified into the same group under
a range of cutoffs.
5∆ 
 
lo
g(S
CL
)
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
Replication
of OS
Threatening Non−threatening
Original
OS Results
Threatening Non−threatening
Support for
protective policies
Low
High
Figure 2.1: Change in log skin conductance upon viewing OS threatening and non-
threatening images for groups with low and high support for socially protective
policies. The new data was recorded in the second session, and the results from
OS are shown for comparison.
6Table 2.1: Correlations between responses to threatening and non-threatening OS
images using the OS metric
Spider Maggots Rabbit Fruit
Maggots 0.235 Fruit 0.277
Bloody 0.083 0.158 Happy -0.055 -0.043
(A) Threatening images (B) Non-threatening images
2.1.2 Selection of stimuli
Even without the differences shown in Fig. 2.1, there are good reasons to be con-
cerned about the reliability of the OS methods. They used only three ‘threatening’
and three ‘non-threatening’ images each out of a total of 25 images shown to sub-
jects, and only one of their images had been previously characterized in terms of
emotional content.1 The threatening images were a spider on a man’s face, mag-
gots in a wound, and a man with a bloody face and shirt, but when our subjects
saw the images, there was little consistency in individual reactions to images in
each set; the cross-correlations in SCR signals using the OS metric are shown in
Table 2.1.
2.1.3 Order effects and measurement problems
The ordering of the OS images was also fixed. Though it is easier to find differences
between subjects who all observe the same ordering, skin conductance responses
to stimuli are characterized by a quick jump upwards a few seconds after stimulus
onset followed by a roughly exponential decay, and the time constant of that decay
is long enough that the response from one image spills over into the next.
The spillover of reactions between images was especially problematic because
of the metric they used for skin conductance response. OS calculated SCR’s by
1The image of the bloody man in OS is IAPS code 3550 and was characterized by (Mikels et
al., 2005) to elicit a very non-specific mixture of emotions.
7subtracting the log skin conductance during each image from the log skin conduc-
tance during the 10 second before each image, but this metric does not account
for the slow decay time and can thus produce negative autocorrelation between
successive images. A strong response to one image will result in a jump in skin
conductance followed by a slow decline that extends into the next image’s time,
and this slow decline will bias upwards the skin conductance measured in the next
10 second gap relative to the skin conductance during the next image display, and
so the calculated response to the next image will be biased downwards.
Because of the fixed ordering, the same images spilled over into each other for
all subjects, and so the errors carry through to the group level. There is no way to
know, then, whether reactions to ‘threatening’ images are really reactions to those
images or artifacts of reactions to images that came before. So, while it is valid to
say that OS showed a difference between groups, there is no way to interpret that
difference.
The phasic and driver metrics for SCR (described in Methods) are less sensitive
to order effects than the OS metric, but in our IAPS images where randomization
averages away order effects, and where we have enough images for reliable mea-
surements, the three metrics look very similar (Fig. 2.6). For the OS protocol with
fixed ordering and only 3 of the images of each type, there are clear differences
between the three metrics that highlight the impact of order effects (Fig. 2.5).
For the OS images and fixed order, the OS metric shows conservatives reacting
more strongly than liberals to both threatening and non-threatening stimuli, the
phasic metric shows conservatives reacting less to threatening images but more to
non-threatening ones , and finally, the driver metric shows conservatives reacting
less across both stimulus types. The driver metric, which is the most robust to
order effects and non-biological noise, is not affected by the design problems of the
OS protocol, and so its results for the OS images are very similar to those of our
improved design.
82.2 New protocol
Fig. 2.2a shows the reactions of liberal and conservative groups across the three
image treatments. We use the driver metric for skin conductance because, com-
pared to the available alternatives, it is robust to order effects, gives a more direct
picture of the underlying SNS activation, and is usable over long stimuli like our
emotional videos. Mean skin conductance response in every category is higher
among those with low support for protective policies. The differences are not
statistically significant in any category alone (p > 0.2), but they are borderline
significant (p = 0.052 by two-sided permutation test) when taken together.
The group-level consistency in reactions signals that individual reactions are
likely correlated across the treatments, and this is generally the case, as shown
in Fig. 2.3a. Reactions to the neutral positive and fear treatments are clearly
strongly correlated, but the disgust treatment is somewhat less correlated with
the other two. There do not appear to be strong order effects, so, for example,
someone who saw the fear condition in the first session and the disgust condition in
the second session had reactions similar to those of someone who did the reverse.
For verification, we also examined subjects’ reactions to the emotional videos
and found they were very similar to the image reactions. Skin conductance re-
sponses during the video (Fig. 2.2b) are very similar to those for IAPS pictures
(Fig. 2.2a). Individuals with low support for socially protective policies tend
to respond more strongly across all treatments, and as with the images, though
the differences are not statistically significant separately (p > .15), they are quite
significant when viewed across all three treatments (p = 0.016 by two-sided per-
mutation test).
Finally, the correlation in skin conductance responses between video treatments
(Fig. 2.3b) was similar to what we observed with the images. Individuals who
reacted strongly to the fear videos tended to also react strongly to the neutral
positive videos, but reactions to disgust videos were less correlated with either of
the other two treatments.
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(b) Videos
Figure 2.2: Driver SCR to neutral positive, disgusting, and frightening (a) images
and (b) videos across groups with low and high support for socially protective
policies. Boxes show the mean and standard errors of responses in each group.
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Figure 2.3: Scatterplots and correlations of reactions to different treatment (a)
images and (a) videos across trials. 95% confidence intervals are also shown for
the correlations. Subjects who received the row treatment in the first session are
marked +, those who saw the column treatment first are marked x.
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2.2.1 PNS activation
We also compared groups and treatments in terms of respiratory sinus arrhyth-
mia (RSA), which is generally viewed as measuring activation of the peripheral
nervous system (Brownley et al., 2000). PNS activation tends to reduce a per-
son’s heart rate, but PNS input to cardiac cells is diminished momentarily during
inhalation. This connection results in synchronized variation—the RSA—in res-
piratory and instantaneous heart rate signals that depends on the level of PNS
activation (Brownley et al., 2000). We estimate this synchronization using the
wavelet coherence approach from (Keissar et al., 2009) over the high-frequency
band (.14-.4 Hz), though we compare the results of a more traditional peak-valley
method (Grossman et al., 1990) in the SI.
Previous work has shown a connection between resting RSA and emotions
(Oveis et al., 2009), and to reactions and emotion regulation in response to emo-
tional stimuli (Demaree et al., 2004) or during social interactions (Butler et al.,
2006), but we do not observe a connection between baseline RSA and social policy
preferences (Fig. 2.7). Our baseline RSA is calculated during the pre-stimulus
questions in the first session or during the OS images in the second session, and
neither show much of a difference between the two groups.
As shown in Fig. 2.4A, RSA differences between social liberals and conserva-
tives do appear following the treatments, but only in the fear condition. In this
context, increased RSA can be interpreted as increased emotion regulation, or an
effort by the subjects to limit the impact of the emotional stimuli. Individuals
in general tend to regulate their emotions in the disgust condition without any
observable difference between social liberals and conservatives. Under the fear
condition, however, socially liberal subjects appear to increase their emotion reg-
ulation while conservatives either do not change or actually decrease regulation.
The group difference is highly significant (p = .015).
Note that while RSA is a fairly reliable indicator of PNS activation, the step
from PNS activation to emotion regulation relies on reverse inference. In this
context, though, when the only stimuli are emotional images and videos, there
12
are no other clear drivers of PNS activation, so interpreting RSA as a measure of
emotion regulation is reasonable.
2.2.2 Reactions to video stimuli
The effects of the videos on RSA are shown in Fig. 2.4B and are very similar
to what we obtained when subjects reacted to the images. For the RSA metric,
since changes in emotional state and regulation are slow, this is not an entirely
independent verification of the image results, but the videos are all long enough
that these plots do contain substantial independent information.
Because of the length of the videos, the RSA measurements are cleaner than
they were for the images, and the differences between the groups parallel what
we observed for the images. In the fear condition, socially liberal subjects do not
change much on average, but conservatives’ RSA falls, though the group-level dif-
ference is only borderline significant (p = .053). In the disgust condition, both
groups show a strong increase in RSA, and there is some indication that conser-
vatives may change more than liberals, though this difference is not statistically
significant (p = .16).
As discussed in more detail in the SI, we replicated the RSA analysis using a
more traditional peak-valley metric. The group-level differences in the fear con-
dition were consistent across metrics, and conservatives showed somewhat higher
RSA in the disgust condition, though the group difference was once again nei-
ther statistically significant or consistent between images and videos. Taken as a
whole, the finding that conservatives had lower RSA in the fear condition is well
supported and robust, while the finding that conservatives had higher RSA in the
disgust condition is weaker and could be specific to the particular stimuli.
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(b) Videos
Figure 2.4: RSA during the (a) image and (b) video stimuli relative to common
baselines. The RSA baseline was calculated over the pre-stimulus questions in the
first session or over the OS images in the second session.
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2.3 Discussion
The results reported in OS were very different from the reactions of our subjects
to those same images shown in the same order calculated by the same metric, but
we found that the fixed ordering of the OS protocol coupled with the OS metric
was likely the reason for this discrepancy.
We found that people with different levels of support for socially protective
policies tended to react differently across the images, but the overall pattern is
that more liberal subjects tended to react more strongly to all types of stimuli.
We did not find a clear interaction between the type of stimulus and relative skin
conductance reactions of liberal versus conservative subjects, though the RSA data
suggests that the fear stimuli might differentiate between liberals and conservatives
more than the others. This does not necessarily imply that fearful reactions are
a more relevant driver of political ideology than disgusted or pleasant reactions
since we are limited to a small sample of emotional stimuli, and the fearful stimuli
that we use could simply generate more consistent reactions in people.
These results should not be interpreted causally, as there are simply too many
mechanisms that could produce a positive correlation between social liberalism
and reactivity. That said, there is clearly some connection between physiologi-
cal reactions and political ideology, and it is the task of future research to parse
out the precise mechanisms at play. Though in this paper we have employed the
same measure of ideology as OS—support for socially protective policies—it is not
clear whether this is more clearly connected to reactions than other measures of
ideology. We have shown that there is some relationship between this ideologi-
cal metric and reactions to images, but this certainly does not mean that other
metrics are unrelated or even that social protection is the best metric to use. Our
understanding of how biological factors relate to ideology is extremely limited, and
an optimal ideological model for use in physiological or neurological studies has
yet to be found.
Finally, external validity is an obvious concern here, especially since our sub-
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jects’ reactions to the OS protocol were so different from the OS subjects’ under
the same analysis techniques. It is possible that the factors that influence indi-
viduals’ preferences vary across environments, so the relationship between social
preferences and physiology may be modulated by other factors like locally domi-
nant ideologies, group affiliations, race, ethnicity, or local events. Further research
across a variety of populations, regions, or countries is needed to understand what
facets of physiology and ideology are common across the population and which
depend on other factors.
2.4 Materials
2.4.1 Subjects
40 subjects (17 female) participated in the experiment. The mean age was 41
(SD=13). About a third of the subjects were recruited through flyers posted at
the Democratic and Republican field offices in Pasadena leading up to the 2010
elections. A small number of subjects were recruited through flyers posted at
universities around Pasadena and Los Angeles, and then the rest were recruited
through an advertisement on Craigslist. A preliminary filtering step was used to
ensure that the subject pool was balanced between Democratic and Republican
registrants.
Subjects were paid $30 per hour with a minimum of $50 if they took less than 1
hour 40 minutes, and parking was provided close to the laboratory. Subjects were
scheduled for times that fit into their schedules, and they started the experiment
between 10 AM and 5:30 PM. An effort was made to schedule subjects away from
when they usually woke up or went to sleep.
Subjects were matched into groups by age, gender, and political party registra-
tion. Treatments were assigned randomly in each group, and for groups that had
more than 3 subjects, the remaining treatments were randomized. In the second
session, the treatments were rotated within each group to maintain balance across
treatments, but the rotation direction was randomized between groups.
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2.4.2 Stimulus materials
Treatment images came from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS)
(Lang et al., 2008), a set of standardized images commonly used in psychology
research for eliciting various emotions. The disgust and fear conditions used sets of
ten IAPS images each that were classified by (Mikels et al., 2005) as either primarily
disgusting or primarily frightening, and the control condition used a set of neutral
positive images chosen from those classified by (Lang et al., 2008) as moderate
arousal and positive valence. The image codes are listed in the Supplemental
information (Section 2.5).
The stimulus videos had also been used and characterized by others. For
disgust, we used a clip that combined one minute from Trainspotting and one
minute from Pink Flamingos;2 for fear, we showed a clip from Silence of the Lambs;
and for a control, we used a scene from Alaska’s Wild Denali. The fear and control
clips were edited according to the instructions in (Rottenberg et al., 2007). The
stimuli were all presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3 package for
MATLAB (Brainard, 1997).
The OS image stimuli and presentation order were obtained from the OS au-
thors.
2.4.3 Task and measures
Subjects came to the laboratory in two sessions; the first was in October or De-
cember 2010, and the second was in February and early March 2011. In the first
session, they started with a variety of psychological batteries and a survey of their
political preferences.3 After those were complete, they were connected to a BioPac
MP150 with modules to measure skin conductance on both palms, a 2-lead elec-
trocardiogram, and respiratory effort. Subjects then answered 17 questions about
their policy preferences and then viewed randomly assigned disgusting, frightening,
or neutral positive images and videos. They then completed more policy preference
2This clip was kindly provided to us by Justin Feinstein from the University of Iowa.
3Specific details of these questionnaires are in the Supplementary Information.
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questions as part of the priming effect experiment.
In the second session, subjects were connected to the physiological measure-
ment equipment and were then shown the exact image set and ordering used by
OS. They were then randomly rotated into one of the two treatment conditions
that they did not see in the first session, and they viewed the new treatment’s im-
ages and videos. As in the first session, subjects answered more policy preference
questions, and then at the end, all subjects watched the neutral positive video to
shift them towards a common emotional baseline and then viewed images from the
two other categories, one of which they had seen in the first session.4
Skin conductance was measured using electrodes on the thenar and hypothenar
eminences of the subject’s non-dominant hand. Electrodes were also connected on
the subject’s dominant hand, but only the non-dominant signals are used here. A
BioPac MP150 recorded both skin conductance channels, electrocardiogram, and
respiratory effort signals.
There are many ways to estimate skin conductance response, but in this paper
we examine only 3. The “OS” metric subtracts the log skin conductance from
the 10 seconds before each image from the mean log skin conductance during each
image. The other two metrics are calculated using the MATLAB package LedaLab
(Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010a,b). The “phasic” metric extracts the phasic por-
tion of the skin conductance signal from long-term trends and then measures the
peak response during the stimulus away from the median signal in the 10 seconds
before the stimulus. The “driver metric” calculates the SNS signal underlying the
skin conductance responses by means of nonnegative deconvolution using a kernel
function optimized to each individual’s skin conductance characteristics. For the
phasic and driver metrics, we masked out skin conductance measurements in the
first second of each image or gap since SCR reactions to stimulus onsets are delayed
by a few seconds, and so any spikes in the first second cannot be interpreted as
reactions to the stimulus. The phasic and driver metric distributions are approx-
4The second session treatment appeared to impact subjects’ reactions to these final images,
so they are not used in the analyses.
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imately lognormal with a few points at zero, so we transformed these signals by
log(x+ 10−3) in analyses. When multiple images are included in a measurement,
the metrics are calculated for each image and are then averaged.
2.4.4 Analyses
SCR and processing was done in MATLAB 2010a, and RSA processing and sta-
tistical analyses were done in R 2.14.
Joint significance of group differences in reactions to all stimuli were calculated
using permutation tests to account for the randomization structure. Each individ-
ual reacted to two measurements, so to account for interdependence between an
individual’s two measurements, we permuted support for socially protective poli-
cies and calculated the fraction of times that all the differences in group averages
for the permuted data had the same sign and were as far in absolute value from
zero as the actual data.
We convert the responses to the Wilson-Patterson questions into a binary vari-
able rather than analyzing the sum of the responses as a continuous variable. This
is necessary for the comparison with OS, and since it appears that most of the rel-
evant variation in the Wilson-Patterson metric is around the median of the scale,
we also treated the metric as continuous in our analyses. The reasoning for this is
described in more detail in the Supplementary Information.
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2.5 Supplemental information
2.5.1 IAPS image codes
Table 2.2: IAPS codes for images used in the experiment
Disgust : 7360 7380 9290 9300 9320 9330 9373 9390 9570 9830
Fear : 6370 1110 1113 1301 1302 1930 1931 3280 5970 9600
Neutral Positive : 7230 2650 7325 8470 2500 2370 1604 1810 1750 1500
True Neutral : 2190 2440 2840 7000 7004 7006 7010 7020 7031 7035
7050 7080 7110 7150 7175 7185 7187 7217 7491 7950
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2.5.2 Comparison of SCR metrics
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(c) Deconvolved driver signal
Figure 2.5: Comparison of our subjects’ reactions to OS images under various
metrics
21
∆ 
 
lo
g(S
CL
)
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
Neut. Pos.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Disgust
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Fear
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Support for
 protective policies
● Low
● High
(a) Difference in logs
Ph
as
ic
 S
CR
 (µ
S)
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Neut. Pos.
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Disgust
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Fear
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
Support for
 protective policies
● Low
● High
(b) Phasic baseline-to-peak
M
ea
n 
dr
ive
r 
SC
R 
(µS
)
10−3
10−2.5
10−2
10−1.5
10−1
10−0.5
100
Neut. Pos.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Disgust
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Fear
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Support for
 protective policies
● Low
● High
(c) Deconvolved driver signal
Figure 2.6: Comparison of our subjects’ reactions to IAPS images under various
metrics
Note that the standard deviations of reactions to the IAPS images are smaller than
for the OS images. There are two reasons for this. First, each data point under
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the IAPS images is the average of 10 image reactions per individual while the
OS images have only 3 per person. There are high levels of variability within an
individual in how they react to each picture, and averaging over ten pictures rather
than three improves the precision of individual estimates by a factor of about 1.8,
and this then translates into tighter estimates of the group-level means. Second,
the variability between images within an individual was lower on the IAPS images
than on the OS images because the IAPS images were much more closely matched
in terms of emotional specificity.
2.5.3 Baseline RSA
Baseline RSA was highly variable between individuals in both rounds, but there
were no discernible group-level differences. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the group-
level comparisons and also the correlation in baseline RSA across sessions.
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of the groups’ baseline RSA calculated over the pre-
stimulus questions in the first session or over the OS images in the second session
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Figure 2.8: Scatterplot of each subjects’ baseline RSA during the first and second
sessions. + symbols give the group-level mean and are encircled by 95% confidence
ellipses of the means based on a multivariate normal approximation.
2.5.4 Peak-valley RSA
Since the spectral RSA method is relatively new to the psychophysiology literature,
we replicated some of the plots and analysis using an older peak-valley approach.
To calculate this, we first located all peaks and troughs in the respiration data and
calculated the instantaneous heart rate at each peak and trough. We generated
a new stepwise time series with steps at each peak and trough and with levels
equal to the difference between the instantaneous heart rate at the nearest peak
and trough. We calculated the median of this time series over the stimulus display
times after masking out the first 2 seconds that the stimulus was visible to account
for response delays.
The peak-valley RSA values were similar to the spectral RSA values, though
both are characterized by a moderate amount of noise. Fig. 2.10 compares the
two during the baseline periods and Fig. 2.13 does the same during the videos.
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Figure 2.9: Scatterplot of each subjects’ baseline peak-valley RSA during the first
and second sessions
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of spectral and peak-valley RSA during baseline periods
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of spectral and peak-valley RSA during stimulus videos
relative to common baseline
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of spectral and peak-valley RSA during stimulus images
relative to common baseline
Fig. 2.13 is the same as Fig. 2.4 in the main text but is calculated using
peak-valley RSA rather than spectral RSA.
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(b) Videos
Figure 2.13: Peak-valley RSA during the (a) image and (b) video stimuli relative
to common baselines. The RSA baseline was calculated over the pre-stimulus
questions in the first session or over the OS images in the second session.
The group-level differences for peak-valley RSA are borderline significant for
fear videos (p = .069) and in the same direction but not significant for fear images.
The difference for disgust images was also borderline significant (p = .075), but the
disgust videos were not. This reverses the pattern of significance from the spectral
RSA calculation, but the sign of the difference is the same across images, videos,
and metrics, so the difference is suggestive but may be sensitive to particular
stimuli.
Finally, the peak-valley RSA metric shows a significant difference in the neutral
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positive videos (p = .022), and the sign is similar for images. These reverse the
pattern under the spectral RSA metric where liberals had lower RSA (though the
difference was not significant even when images and videos were grouped together).
Because of the inconsistency between metrics and between stimulus types, and
because the difference appears to be driven largely by two subjects in the tails,
this is not clearly interpretable.
2.5.5 Wilson-Patterson discretization
We collapse subjects’ responses to the Wilson-Patterson questions into a single
binary variable that tells whether the subject gives responses that are more or less
‘conservative’ (as defined by OS) than the median. Normally, continuous variables
should remain continuous for analysis, but that does not appear appropriate in
this case. First, the data is not truly continuous in the first place; it is a vector of
ordinal trinary variables (Disagree, Uncertain, Agree). There is no reason that the
underlying latent ideology has a linear relationship with the sum of these trinary
variables, nor is there a good reason that the relationship between reactions to
emotional stimuli and latent ideology is linear, and so there is no particular reason
to assume a linear relationship between the sum of the WP responses and reactions.
Of course, there is also no a priori reason that the relationship between two
variables should be a step function, but the data appears to exhibit more of a step
function than a linear trend. This is immediately clear from the scatterplot of
the social WP index versus reactions to the images in Fig. 2.14. There are very
few socially liberal subjects who have weak reactions to the stimuli, while among
conservatives there are a mixture of strong and weak responses, or conversely,
very few weak reactors who are socially liberal. OS found little difference between
binary and continuous metrics for the WP index, but since that paper’s sample
was highly bimodal and had very few data points near the median of the WP scale,
it had little statistical power to distinguish the two models.
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Figure 2.14: Scatterplot of driver skin conductance responses to videos versus
additive Wilson-Patterson scale for socially protective policies
2.5.6 Replication details
Experiment details
All experiments were conducted in a single room at the California Institute of
Technology. Initial surveys were done in a web browser, and the experimental
stimuli were presented from MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3
package (Brainard, 1997).
Questionnaire details
The pre-stimulus questionnaires included the PANAS, STAI, and a survey of po-
litical activities and ideology.
The political survey began with questions on voting history followed by the
Wilson-Patterson ideological battery from (Oxley et al., 2008). That was followed
by the 30-question Moral Foundations Questionnaire and a 7-point branching party
ID question.5 We then asked quiz questions about political figures to gauge po-
litical knowledge, a series of ANES questions about participation during the 2008
5The 30-question Moral Foundations Questionnaire is available from
http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/mft/index.php
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election, and finally a series of demographic questions about age, education, in-
come, race, marital status, children, and history of employment in the military,
medical, or emergency response fields.
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Chapter 3
Self-reported fear and item nonresponse on
surveys
There are three classes of item nonresponse in surveys: structural nonresponse
where the survey only asks some questions to a subset of respondents, order-
dependent nonresponse like panel survey attrition and dropout, and respondent-
driven where respondents are asked a question, but do not give an answer. Within
the respondent-driven class, there are further differentiations based on the type
of nonresponse; answering “Don’t know” (DK) on a question is rather different
from refusing to answer a question on privacy or propriety grounds. Our focus
here is on DK responses; those where a subject is asked a question, they do not
object to answering it, but they do not have strong enough thoughts, preferences,
or information to give an answer.1
Survey researchers have known for a long time that DK responses are not
completely random. Ferber (1966) analyzed a very large sample of consumer sur-
veys and found that nonresponse rates varied with both respondent-specific and
question-specific parameters. Francis and Busch (1975) followed this line of re-
search for political surveys and found similar results, and concluded that simply
ignoring non-substantive responses (DK, ‘no opinion’, etc.) or reassigning those
responses to a fixed category both cause problems.
1This work was done in collaboration with Laura Loesch, R. Michael Alvarez, and Lonna
Atkeson
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More recently, Leigh and Martin (1987) showed that similar results hold for
telephone surveys, and Rubin et al. (1995) demonstrated that censored data from
election outcomes can be treated similarly to item nonresponse in surveys.
This line of research focused on understanding what observable respondent
characteristics affected their propensity to skip questions or five non-substantive
responses, but it did not address the possibility of latent biases in an individual’s
propensity to respond. More recently, Loosveldt et al. (2002) showed that item
nonresponse is predictive of survey attrition in panel surveys after controlling for
demographics, meaning there exist some set of respondent characteristics that
predict item nonresponse and panel attrition that are not captured by standard
demographics. This paper explores those latent influences.
3.0.7 Cognitive biases
Cognitive science has shown that a person is not as rational a decision maker as
we would like to believe; heuristics—“rule of thumb” approximate solutions that
allow for rapid processing in a complex world—bias our perceptions, mediating
our interaction with the world (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996).
The study of heuristic biases in voting and other political decisions is well
situated within the framework of the Heuristic-Systematic Model of persuasion
(Todorov et al., 2002), which describes how superficially attended cues influence
attitude change. The HSM specifically attempts to determine which circumstances
elicit preferential use of either the systematic (based on careful attending of all
relevant components of the persuasion message), or heuristic (based on only some
informational cues, especially superficial cues) mode of message processing. While
one mode may dominate processing, this dual-process model does not assume that
only one mode is used at a time. When cues from both modes are congruent,
simultaneous systematic and heuristic cues combine additively, further promot-
ing the decision. On the other hand, the two systems can work against each other
when systematic and heuristic cues are incongruent. In the incongruent case, more
deliberately processed systematic cues will attenuate heuristic cues. However, if
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those systematic cues are ambiguous about their persuasion message, heuristic
cues will take precedence, even if this results in an individual being persuaded
of something they would not agree with if the systematic cues had been more
straightforward. In other words, when the facts are confusing, we rely more on our
gut reaction to figure things out. Certain circumstances lead to the use of a cer-
tain mode of processing. Under conditions of reduced cognitive capacity, heuristic
processing dominates; under conditions of increased motivation hopefully, voting
is an example of this systematic processing dominates. Increased motivation is
a function of the sufficiency principle, which states that processing effort (degree
to which systematic processing is used) increases with an increased difference be-
tween someone’s actual and desired confidence in a persuasive message. In short,
if something is important to someone, they will desire high confidence in a persua-
sive message. Systematic processing of the persuasion message is more likely to
yield a higher actual confidence in the message, which will match the high desired
confidence. Although the HSM was designed to model persuasion, it has become
a more general model of social information processing.
While exploring ways to directly test the above assumptions of the HSF,
(Todorov et al., 2002) developed the bias hypothesis of the HSM, which is spe-
cially situated to real-life application since it focuses upon how implicit, affectively
driven processes bias persuasion. In this model, heuristic processing plays a key
role. And real life—where we often receive mixed messages—is just the sort of am-
biguous situation in which the HSM predicts that heuristic processing will come
to the forefront. The hypothesis proposes that this heuristic bias in the face of
ambiguity is independent of motivation. Hence, one may make a decision or be
persuaded of something with which they might not consciously agree; this obser-
vation renders the sufficiency principle of the HSM powerless. The implications for
survey research are significant: respondents may be so highly motivated to answer
questions—or conversely, to skip questions—that they do so whether or not they
actually have an answer.
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3.0.8 Outline
This paper will introduce a set of questions about fear from Caltech’s module
on the 2008 CCES surveys, and will compare responses to those questions with
“Don’t know” responses on other survey questions. That comparison is split into
three parts. We begin with simple bivariate comparisons and uncontrolled regres-
sions, then we move to a traditional index-based regression approach to control
for omitted variable biases and dig into demographic variation. We conclude with
a newer modeling approach that uses latent variables and item response theory
models to avoid some of the problems with index-based regressions. The paper
finishes with a discussion of modeling techniques and the utility of using multiple
analysis methods in explanatory research.
3.1 Measurement of fear
All the data in this paper comes from the 2008 CCES surveys, including both the
Common Content and Caltech’s module. The survey was administered online to
a balanced sample of the US population, and it had a panel structure with two
waves. The first wave was fielded before the 2008 general election, and then the
second was given to the same respondents after the election. Just under 80% of
the individuals from the first wave continued for the second.
For measuring respondents’ fear, the following questions appeared as a matrix
of radio buttons in the pre- and post-election 2008 CCES Surveys:
Question Text: Listed below are some objects and situations. Using
the scoring system below, rate each on the intensity of fear that
you associate with that specific object or event.
Columns: No fear, very little fear, A little fear, Some fear, Much fear,
Great fear, Terror
Rows: Spiders, Not being a success, Being a passenger in a plane,
Suffocating
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Rows were randomly rotated, and columns were randomly reversed. Figure 3.1
shows the distributions of responses to the four fear questions, split by responses on
the pre-election and post-election surveys. Respondents covered the full range of
possible responses, though as expected, more people report low levels than report
high levels of fear.
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
po
nd
en
ts
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
50
100
150
200
250
Spiders
Being a passenger in a plane
no
 fe
ar
ve
ry 
littl
e f
ea
r
a 
littl
e f
ea
r
so
m
e 
fea
r
m
uc
h f
ea
r
gre
at 
fea
r
ter
ror
Not being a success
Suffocating
no
 fe
ar
ve
ry 
littl
e f
ea
r
a 
littl
e f
ea
r
so
m
e 
fea
r
m
uc
h f
ea
r
gre
at 
fea
r
ter
ror
Survey Round
Pre
Post
Figure 3.1: Distributions of answers to each of the 4 fear questions, split by re-
sponses on the pre-election and post-election surveys
Figure 3.2 shows the joint distribution of each variable’s responses between the
pre- and post-election surveys, and the correlations between the pre- and post-
questions are shown in Table 3.1. Answers to each of the four questions were
reasonably correlated between the two survey periods, with correlations ranging
from a low of .61 for fear of not being a success to .77 for fear of spiders. The
correlation with all fear answers grouped together was .70.
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Figure 3.2: Joint distributions of the pre- and post-election answers to each of the
4 fear questions
Table 3.1: Correlation in answers to pre-election and post-election surveys by
variable
Spiders 0.769
Not being a Success 0.605
Being a passenger on a plane 0.714
Suffocating 0.675
All Combined 0.704
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The question therefore appear valid as a measurement tool, in that there is vari-
ation across the population, and there is consistency over time within individual
respondents.
The 8 fear variables, four from each survey round, fall on an intuitive set of
principal components. The first component puts positive weights on all the fear
variables, and the second component differentiates between respondents who were
more scared of not being a success than of being a passenger on a plane. The full
set of factor loadings and component standard deviations are shown in Table 3.2,
but for the purposes of this paper, we’ll focus on only the first principal component.
Finally, though the questions are internally consistent, they have serious valid-
ity problems. In testing not reported in this paper, our measure of fear was not
as predictive of political behavior as any of the biological or psychological experi-
ments discussed in the introduction. Nor did it have as strong of an effect as that
found in another fear-based NES study that by Skaperdas and Grofman (1995).
There are two primary problems with the questions we asked to derive the
fear score. Firstly, they may have been too outright about asking about fear and
therefore generated a response bias. For example, individuals who are socialized
not to admit to various fears may have downgraded their actual fear in their re-
port. Unfortunately, response bias is common in self-report surveys (Donaldson
and Grant-Vallone, 2002) as individuals wish to portray themselves in a good light
regardless of the confidentiality of the survey. One of the best ways to overcome
this is to ask questions that are as non-indicative of socially loaded traits as pos-
sible. A second source that may have biased answers is how individuals read the
individual questions—“How fearful are you of suffocating?” may have effectively
asked one respondent if they are always terrified of suffocation while it may have
asked another respondent if they would be terrified if faced with a situation in
which suffocation seemed likely.
However, the second problem is that even if we can trust that respondents
answered our question in a consistent manner, our questions may not have been
appropriate to the task we wished to achieve. Fear of spiders; fear of suffocation;
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fear of airplanes; fear of failure—all but the last of these pinpoint phobias. And
phobias do not tap into pervasive behavior. They are situation-specific, and, as
such, cannot reliably be expected to contribute to general political ideology, unless,
of course, there is a party that promotes the extermination of all spiders.
What may instead be important to political behavior is if a person is extremely
frightened of the majority of these things, as possessing that many phobias would
be unusual. Indeed, we might expect such a person to be “scared” of nearly ev-
erything. This person would display a personality trait for anxiety, which would
be relevant to political behavior. Indeed, Huddy et al. (2005) demonstrated that
it is relevant to consider anxiety as distinct to specific fear in relation to political
behavior: they showed that the perception of threat and experience of anxiety
affected attitudes towards antiterrorism policies differently. Simply, being specif-
ically afraid of something motivates behavior differently from being anxious. It
behooves political scientists to choose which behavior they are interested in; for
the original purposes—explaining general ideology, measuring anxiety seems most
relevant. While high levels of fear as derived in this paper may point to anxious
individuals, these questions are not actually very good.
The very things that make our fear questions problematic for actually measur-
ing fear or anxiety–individual interpretations and social biases–can be helpful for
tapping into where else those biases matter in survey research.
3.1.1 Predictors of fear variables
We modeled the first principal component of the fear questions based on available
demographic covariates: race, income, education, age, gender, church attendance,
and whether the respondent is a born-again Christian. We also checked whether
ideology or party identification were related to fear reports. The results of these
models are shown in Table 3.3.
In general, younger, poorer, and less educated respondents said they were
more afraid. People who attended church said they had less fear, but Born-again
Christians tended to be more fearful.
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Ideology and party identification were not statistically significant, and their
effects could be constrained to be relatively small. When a quadratic term was
added for partisanship, it was not significant either. Partisanship and ideology
also had little impact on the estimated effects of the other variables, so we can be
relatively confident that the fear variables are not directly connected to ideology
or partisanship.
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3.2 “Don’t know” responses
Across the pre- and post-election surveys, the CCES data has 139 questions with
DK options2, and of these, 128 were asked to at least 200 individuals could be
included in our analysis. Since the 2008 CCES was administered online, the DK
option was visible to respondents, so they all had an equal opportunity to skip
those questions.
As would be expected, the questions had a wide range of DK frequencies.
Questions with low rates of DK responses included one about the state of the
economy, a post-election question about how people voted (conditional on them
having voted), and a post-election question on how the respondent voted in the
House race.
Questions with high DK frequencies included those about candidate placements
on ideological scales, ones that ask about preferences on specific policies, a question
about the previous day’s Dow index, and one that asked respondents to estimate
the unemployment rate. The distribution of DK frequencies across questions is
shown in Figure 3.3.
3.2.1 Fear reports and “don’t know”
The raw data hint at a connection between answers to the fear questions and DK
responses. If we look at logit regression fits of ‘don’t know” responses to average
fear response for each question separately, as in Figure 3.4, most of the curves
have moderate upward slopes. The standard errors (not shown) of the individual
curves are very large, but despite that, the average across all of the questions can
be estimated very precisely.
Before we consider any potential confounding variables, there appears to be
a statistically significant and relatively large connection between fear ratings and
the frequency of DK responses.
However, we showed earlier that there was a strong relationship between fear
2We also include other phrasings of ‘don’t know’ like ‘not sure’, ‘I’m not sure’, ‘I do not know’.
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Figure 3.3: Distributions of DK responses across all questions that had DK or
variants as possible answers
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Figure 3.4: Fitted curves from logistic regressions of DK responses on an individ-
ual’s average answer to the fear questions. Dotted red line is regression aggregated
across all questions. The 95% confidence interval is shown in gray for the aggre-
gated regression, but it is very narrow and may not be visible.
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responses and a variety of demographic variables like age, gender, church atten-
dance, education, and income. We would expect that some, if not all of these
variables would also have an impact on an individual’s ability or desire to answer
a question, so there is a strong chance that the uncontrolled regressions suffer from
omitted variable bias.
One interpretation of these results, which we will attempt to test later in the
paper, is that individuals who are willing to admit being more afraid of things—or
who do not feel social pressures to not admit fear—are also more willing to admit
that they do not know things. In the US, social pressure to not admit fear is
generally stronger for males than for females, and so we would expect that males
who are unwilling to admit fear might do so because of social pressures, and those
social pressures might also dissuade them from admitting that they do not know
an answer.
The social undesirability of DK responses only matters if an individual does
not actually have a clear answer to a question; social pressures do not matter if
you would never answer DK regardless. Thus we would also expect that any of
these social desirability differences would be modulated by an individual’s political
knowledge or interest.
Because of the danger of confounding variables, and our interest in interactions,
the next two sections examine several other models that control for demographic
effects and differences in political knowledge. The first section uses a traditional
approach to model an index of DK responses based on demographics, a knowledge
index, and a fear index. The second section uses a latent variable approach based
on item response theory to avoid problems caused by simple additive indices.
3.2.2 Traditional model
The traditional approach to modeling this sort of data starts with indices of DK
response frequency and of fear responses. The simplest option for the DK index
would be to just add up all of an individual’s DK answers.
However, in our data, respondents were asked varying numbers of questions.
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Attrition between the pre-election and post-election waves of the CCES survey,
randomized assignment, and branching assignment of questions all produce non-
uniform missingness. Thus, instead of sums of DK responses, we have to work
with averages. The missingness also means that the DK responses are not entirely
comparable across individuals. For example, questions that were only asked to a
few respondents tended to show very slightly higher rates of DK responses, so this
averaging method is somewhat biased by construction. This will be remedied by
the latent variable models that we introduce later.
The fear index was simpler. We simply averaged the 7-point response scales
across all the questions an individual was asked. The fear questions were only
missing when there was attrition between the pre and post waves, and since the
same questions were asked in the pre and post waves, the fear scale does not suffer
the same potential biases as the DK scale.
Finally, since an individual’s interest in politics is likely to impact their desire
to answer political questions, we also constructed a political activity scale. This
added together indicator variables for whether a respondent had ever attended a
campaign meeting, posted a political sign, persuaded someone else how to vote,
donated money to a campaign, or worked or volunteered for a campaign. To aid
interpretability, the fear and activity indices were rescaled to have mean 0 and
variance 1 across the sample.
We then regressed the DK index on the fear index, the individual interest index,
and demographic variables. Table 3.4 displays the fitted models with different
indices included, and additional models interacting the indices with each other
and with gender.
Not surprisingly, politically active individuals tend give answers to more ques-
tions. One standard deviation of the activity index translates into about 2% fewer
DK responses (over the full activity scale, the effect is about 7%). When we look
at the fear index on its own, the effect is just outside 5% significance, and the
effect size about 3% over the scale’s entire range (.6% per standard deviation).
Considering that the average rate of DK responses across all questions is only
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Table 3.4: Fitted models of DK index regressed on demographics and other indices.
P-levels are denoted by *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001.
Variable Base Activity Fear Activity+Fear
(Intercept) 0.221*** (0.015) 0.211*** (0.017) 0.217*** (0.015) 0.208*** (0.016)
Female 0.050*** (0.006) 0.046*** (0.006) 0.046*** (0.006) 0.041*** (0.007)
Education -0.011*** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002)
Age -0.343*** (0.088) -0.271** (0.094) -0.342*** (0.090) -0.224* (0.095)
Age2 0.048 (0.088) -0.042 (0.094) 0.053 (0.088) -0.028 (0.094)
Ideology -0.008** (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.008* (0.003) -0.011** (0.003)
Black 0.017 (0.010) 0.023* (0.011) 0.014 (0.010) 0.020 (0.011)
Hispanic 0.017 (0.012) 0.013 (0.013) 0.017 (0.012) 0.013 (0.013)
Other nonwhite 0.004 (0.014) 0.016 (0.016) 0.003 (0.014) 0.015 (0.016)
Income -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001)
No Church 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009)
Church Weekly -0.010 (0.007) -0.009 (0.008) -0.009 (0.007) -0.009 (0.008)
Born-Again 0.012 (0.007) 0.016* (0.008) 0.011 (0.007) 0.015 (0.008)
Activity . . -0.020*** (0.003) . . -0.020*** (0.003)
Fear . . . . 0.006 (0.003) 0.009** (0.003)
Activity:Female . . . . . . . .
Fear:Female . . . . . . . .
Activity:Fear . . . . . . . .
Activity:Fear:Female . . . . . . . .
Variable Activity∗Gender Fear∗Gender Activity∗Fear Activity∗Fear∗Gender
(Intercept) 0.210*** (0.016) 0.218*** (0.015) 0.206*** (0.016) 0.205*** (0.016)
Female 0.046*** (0.006) 0.046*** (0.006) 0.040*** (0.007) 0.040*** (0.007)
Education -0.007** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.006* (0.002) -0.006* (0.002)
Age -0.260** (0.094) -0.342*** (0.090) -0.222* (0.095) -0.214* (0.094)
Age2 -0.038 (0.094) 0.052 (0.088) -0.017 (0.093) -0.008 (0.093)
Ideology -0.011*** (0.003) -0.008* (0.003) -0.011** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.003)
Black 0.022* (0.011) 0.014 (0.010) 0.020 (0.011) 0.019 (0.011)
Hispanic 0.014 (0.013) 0.017 (0.012) 0.013 (0.012) 0.013 (0.012)
Other nonwhite 0.015 (0.016) 0.003 (0.014) 0.017 (0.016) 0.017 (0.016)
Income -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001)
No Church 0.010 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009)
Church Weekly -0.009 (0.008) -0.009 (0.007) -0.009 (0.008) -0.009 (0.008)
Born-Again 0.015 (0.008) 0.011 (0.007) 0.014 (0.008) 0.014 (0.008)
Activity -0.014** (0.004) . . -0.021*** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.004)
Fear . . 0.007 (0.005) 0.008* (0.003) 0.010* (0.005)
Activity:Female -0.015* (0.006) . . . . -0.012 (0.007)
Fear:Female . . -0.001 (0.006) . . -0.006 (0.007)
Activity:Fear . . . . -0.008* (0.003) -0.001 (0.005)
Activity:Fear:Female . . . . . . -0.015* (0.007)
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14.8%, though, the fear index effect is potentially large.
Looking at the model that interacts Activity with gender, we see that the ef-
fect of political activity on answering questions is twice as high among females as
among males (2.9% and 1.4% per standard deviation of Activity). The estimated
effects are nearly unchanged when fear interactions are included, though the stan-
dard error estimates widen enough to just drop the gender interaction below 5%
significance.
When we bring Fear into the picture, we first notice that when Activity is
included in the model, the Fear index tends to reach significance. However, the
point estimates do not change dramatically between models, so the variation in
significance across models is not particularly informative. The main effect of Fear
is relatively consistent across the models at about .8% per standard deviation.
Since social biases can only affect DK answers when the respondent does not
actually have a clear answer to give, we would expect that Fear would matter
more for people who are not particularly interested in politics. This is exactly
what we see. In the Activity∗Fear model, people who are 1 standard deviation
above the norm on Activity are not affected by Fear, while people who are 1
standard deviation below on Activity have a very large Fear effect–about 1.6% per
standard deviation of Fear.
Finally, since we expect that males’ Fear indices are influenced more by social
pressures than those of females,3 we expect that the interaction between fear and
activity will be stronger among males. The regressions show just the opposite—the
interaction between activity and fear that we just described appears to be limited
to females.
Males have an effect from Fear (higher Fear produces more frequent DK an-
swers), but they have almost no interaction effect between Activity and Fear. For
females, the effect of activity is slightly greater than for males as in the previous
3Or at least, males are influenced towards over-reporting relative to females, meaning that the
difference in social bias between males and females is positive. We have no way to differentiate
this from the case where females are biased to over-report.
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model (though the gender difference does not quite reach significance), but the ef-
fect of Fear is much greater. Females who are active in politics are influenced little
by Fear, but those who are not active are strongly affected. Inactive females with
high Fear answer “Don’t know” more often, while those with lower Fear answer
“Don’t know” less often.
Among females, the data are very consistent with a social bias explanation:
Females who are biased to admit fear are also biased to admit not knowing an-
swers. Females who are active in politics (and who likely have clearer and stronger
opinions) are not affected by the biases.
Inactive and active males have similar effects of fear, which points away from
there being social biases being at play. If the connection between fear and DK
was rooted in social biases, we would expect that fear would matter more among
inactive males, but we do not see that in the data. We are left with an open
question for why males have a connection between fear and DK responses. It is
unlikely that the connection comes from social biases, but we have no clear signals
about where else it might come from.
3.3 Latent variable models
The above analysis uses indices of fear answers, DK responses, and activity in
simple OLS models. For such indices to actually represent an underlying latent
variable, we have to assume a strong and facially implausible structure on the
relationships between the component questions and the distributions of the latent
variable across the population. A more flexible approach uses item response theory
and treats each question in a set as a separate model (often logits for binary data),
with separate intercept and slope terms for each outcome variable.
This relaxes the assumption that DK responses are the same across questions.
Questions can be easier or harder for people to respond to, and DK’s to a particular
question can be informative about the latent variable of interest, or they can just
be question-specific noise. Most importantly, we do not have to figure these things
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out for ourselves–the data give enough information to fit the question-specific
parameters.
The 2008 CCES survey also included a set of quiz questions about facets of an
individual’s political knowledge. The questions included things like which party
was the majority in the US House and Senate and the party of their senators and
governors. There missingness patterns of these questions make them unusable for
the traditional model, but the latent variable model estimation procedure handles
sparse data directly, so we can use these questions with the comparatively weak
assumption that data is missing at random conditional on other variables included
in the model.
Demographics
"Don't know" 
responses
Fear answers
Latent Fear
Latent 
Knowledge Social 
Pressure
Observed
Random Latent Variables
"Quiz" 
question 
responses
Deterministic Latent Variables
Admitted 
Knowledge Admitted Fear
Figure 3.5: Graphical representation of the latent variable model. Rectangular
nodes are observed data, oval nodes are unobserved latent variables with a random
component, and pentagonal nodes are unobserved latent variables that are fully
deterministic.
A graphical representation of our ideal model is shown in Figure 3.5. Latent
fear represents the answers that people would give in the absence of social pres-
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sure, and then admitted fear is just the latent fear biased by social pressures.
Admitted fear is deterministic for model identification purposes, and—to simplify
interpretation—‘social pressure’ can be interpreted as social biases in fear report-
ing.
Correct responses to quiz questions are assumed to be unbiased signals of latent
knowledge, meaning, for example, that whatever social pressures might modulate
a respondent’s willingness to admit fear or DK will not affect whether they know
which party has that House majority. Admitted knowledge is latent knowledge
after social pressures have influenced how likely someone is to admit that they do
not know something. We include an interaction with demographics, but only let
the demographic variables modulate the strength of social pressure’s influence on
admitted knowledge. That restriction balances the desire to split apart the effects
on different groups against a need to keep an already complicated model as simple
as possible.
This model is too much of a departure from the traditional approach for us to
directly compare the results in a meaningful way. There would be no way to pin
down what facets of the model are responsible for whatever differences we might
observe. Instead, the model will be built up in stages to highlight the impact of
each bit of added complexity.
3.3.1 Separate models for fear and item nonresponse
We will begin by examining two separate unidimensional item response theory
models. There are continuous latent variables called “Fear” and “INR” with infor-
mation about an individual’s level of fear or likelihood of answering DK on survey
questions. We use cumulative link logistic models with varying discrimination,
difficulty, and cutpoints on each fear question to connect responses to the con-
tinuous latent “Fear” variable. Item nonresponse is binary, so item nonresponse
probabilities are modeled as binary logits with varying difficulty and discrimina-
tion between questions. Finally, both “Fear” and “INR” have linear demographic
predictors and i.i.d. noise between individuals. The correlation between “Fear”
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and “INR” is not explicitly modeled here.
For clarity, the responses for each individual i are modeled as shown below:
Fear: responseFqi = 1 +
∑
j∈1,...
{
γFq Feari + ǫ
F
i > CP
F
qj
}
(3.1)
ǫFqi
i.i.d.∼ Logistic(0, 1) (3.2)
Feari
i.i.d.∼ Normal(XiβF , σF ) (3.3)
INR: responseIqi = 1 +
{
γIq INRi − CPIq + ǫIi > 0
}
(3.4)
ǫIi
i.i.d.∼ Logistic(0, 1) (3.5)
INRi
i.i.d.∼ Normal(XiβI , σI) (3.6)
CPFqj and −CPIq are the fear question cutpoints and the INR logit intercept terms,
γ denotes discrimination terms, X is a matrix of demographic variables where each
column is centered and scaled to variance 1, and {. . .} is an indicator function.
To simplify comparisons between models, the latent spaces are transformed after
sampling so that “Fear” and “INR” have mean zero and variance 1. That rescaling
is left out of the mathematical definition above for clarity. All the responses are
coded as integers starting with 1 to simplify comparisons with the model fitting
code. Because we have strong priors that the latent “INR” and “Fear” parameters
should all have positive effects on each question, we constrain the γ terms to be
positive.
This model was coded in the Stan modeling language (Hoffman and Gelman,
2011; Stan Development Team, 2013a,b) and run from R (R Core Team, 2012).
Weakly informative double-exponential priors were used on for βF and βI . 4 chains
were used for each model, and 500 draws were taken from each chain following an
initial 100 adaptation steps.
There are two main features of substantive interest in this model. The first
are the hierarchical predictors–how the various demographic terms impact fear
questions and item nonresponse. The second is the amount of correlation between
(Feari−XiβF ) and (INRi−XiβI) that was not explained by hierarchical predictors.
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Taken together, these features give us a sense for how tightly item nonresponse
is linked to self-reported fear, and a sense for whether the connection is being
captured by available demographic variables.
Figure 3.6 shows the fitted parameter from both models. The most striking
feature is the amount correlation in the parameter estimates between the two
models. The fear and INR estimations were independent of each other, and so the
connection between self-reported fear and item nonresponse is not just a feature of
individuals—the same general group-level patterns hold across both measurements.
In terms of specific parameters, note that demographic variables are scaled
to mean 0 and variance 1, and the latent space is rescaled to have variance 1
on all dimensions, so the proportions of variance explained by each variable are
proportional to their square distance from 0. Females have much higher levels
of both fear and propensity to skip questions, but the effect of gender still only
accounts for approximately 10% of the variance in both fear and item nonresponse
(0.322 = 0.1024). The next most important variables are: Education, which de-
creases INR substantially and has only a small impact on Fear; Age, which prob-
ably increases Fear more than it increases INR; and Income, which probably in-
creases INR slightly more than it does Fear. We say ‘probably’ because the 40%
ellipses are very close to or overlap the 45 ◦ line, and so the relative differences
have substantial uncertainty.
The impacts of other variables are less clear. Conservative ideology tends to
predict lower INR and slightly less fear, as does weekly church attendance (relative
to the baseline occasional church attendance). African-Americans and Born-Again
Christians had slightly higher fear and INR, but the effects are noisy relative to
their sizes.
The model differentiates specific individuals reasonably well. Figure 3.7 shows
the mean latent fear and INR estimates for each individual, plus a representative
95% joint credible ellipse for an individual at (0, 0). There is still substantial noise
in the individual-level estimates, so the group-level parameters are helpful, but
there is still a lot of individual heterogeneity that the group-level parameters do
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Figure 3.6: Fitted parameters of the separate fear and INR models. The over-
lapping labels are for Hisp and ORace. The circles are the joint 40% confidence
ellipses for each parameter in the fear and INR models. 40% ellipses correspond
to t = 1, and they are used to avoid excessive overlap in the visualization. 90%
confidence ellipses are about 2.1 times larger, and 95% ellipses are about 2.4 times
larger. The ellipses are based on the mean and covariance of each parameter’s
draws, which is an approximation of the actual joint distribution of the draws.
The ellipses are circular because the models are fitted independently and do not
incorporate correlated error. The dotted 45 ◦ line shows where the percentage of
variance explained for Fear equals the percentage of variance explained for INR.
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Figure 3.7: Mean latent fear and INR estimates for each individual. The dotted
red ellipse is a representative 95% joint credible ellipse for an individual at (0, 0).
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not capture. The latent INR parameter is also easier to predict at an individual
level than the fear parameter thanks to the large number of questions that people
could skip, and so that also translates into more variation in the mean estimates
on the INR axis. The draws at each stage were scaled so that the latent terms had
variance 1, but variation between draws in each individual’s estimate will tend to
shrink each individual’s mean towards 0—and at the extreme with complete noise,
every individual’s mean would be at (0, 0).
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of correlations in latent fear and INR parameters across
draws from posterior
The correlation between latent fear and INR parameters is apparent in the scat-
ter plot of latent variable means (Figure 3.7), but Figure 3.8 shows the distribution
of this correlation more clearly. The 95% credible interval for the correlation is
[.228, .300], but a substantial amount of this is accounted for by the demographic
variables. For example, ‘Female’ accounts for about 10% of the variance in Fear
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and INR, and the other variables tend to impact Fear and INR similarly, so the
end result is a high level of correlation.
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Figure 3.9: Mean individual-specific variation in latent fear and INR terms. The
dotted red ellipse is a representative 95% joint credible ellipse for an individual at
(0, 0).
When we remove the demographic effects and look at just the individual-
specific variation in Figure 3.9, the amount of correlation is obviously smaller,
and is not immediately obvious in the scatterplot. But the distribution of corre-
lations after removing demographic effects (Figure 3.10) shows that there is still
a positive correlation between INR and Fear, so the connection is not explained
entirely by the demographic variables included here. The 95% credible interval on
the latent noise correlation is [0.008, 0.091].
Note that since the models were estimated independently, the correlation in
latent noise underestimates the actual correlation. The amount of the underesti-
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mation depends on the amount of actual correlation (large correlations will tend
to be underestimated more), but that will be addressed by the unified model in
the next section.
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of correlations in individual-specific latent fear and INR
variation across draws from posterior
Gender differences
For illustration of the effect sizes of demographic variables, Figures 3.11 and 3.12
show the same latent variables and individual variation as 3.7 and 3.9, but with
individuals colored by gender.
The distributions of males and females are clearly different, and individuals
towards the positive ends of the INR and Fear scales are almost all women, while
the low end of both scales is occupied almost exclusively by men. There are not
clear problematic patterns of heteroskedasticity between males and females nor
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Figure 3.11: Mean latent fear and INR estimates for each individual, colored by
gender. Red dots are females, blue ones are males.
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Figure 3.12: Mean individual-specific variation in latent fear and INR terms, col-
ored by gender. Red dots are females, blue ones are males.
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‘chunky’ distributions that would signal estimation issues or misspecification.
3.3.2 Unified model
There is obvious correlation in each individual’s fitted ǫ terms in the previous
model, so the next model iteration will capture that explicitly. The basic structure
of the model is the same, but now the latent variables are drawn according to
(Feari, INRi) ∼ MVN(Xβ,Ω) (3.7)
Since the unexplained correlation was rather small between the independent
models described above, we would not expect large changes in the demographic
parameters when the correlation is modeled explicitly, and we would expect a small
increase in the unexplained correlation.
The fitted demographic parameters for the unified model (Figure 3.13) are
nearly identical to those from the separate model (Figure 3.6), which is to be
expected since the noise correlation has only an indirect impact on those estimates.
The main impact is that the correlated noise produces a slight correlation in the
uncertainty of each demographic variable’s INR and Fear parameters.
The latent variable correlations in Figure 3.14 are increased slightly (around
0.02) relative to the same plot for the separate models in Figure 3.8, and the 95%
credible interval on the latent correlation moves up to [0.242, 0.325] from [.228, .300]
for the separate model. The overall latent correlation results from similarities in
demographic parameters plus then correlation in the latent noise, but the change
in the latent noise correlation explains most of the shift between the separate and
unified models. Figure 3.15 shows the distribution of this correlation, and the shift
is again only slight, with the 95% credible interval moving to [0.030, 0.125] from
[0.008, 0.091] in the separate models.
Overall, the correlation in the latent noise is small enough that adding it into
the model does not make a substantively important difference, but it remains to
be seen which steps later in the model’s expansion will matter.
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Figure 3.13: Fitted parameters of the unified fear and INR model. The circles are
the joint 40% confidence ellipses for each parameter in the fear and INR models.
40% ellipses correspond to t = 1, and they are used to avoid excessive overlap in the
visualization. 90% confidence ellipses are about 2.1 times larger, and 95% ellipses
are about 2.4 times larger. The ellipses are based on the mean and covariance of
each parameter’s draws, which is an approximation of the actual joint distribution
of the draws.
61
0
5
10
15
20
0.0 0.2 0.4
Correlation
de
ns
ity
Figure 3.14: Distribution of correlations in latent fear and INR parameters across
draws from posterior of the unified model
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Figure 3.15: Distribution of correlations in individual-specific latent Fear and INR
variation across draws from posterior of the unified model
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3.3.3 Incorporating quiz questions
The next step in the model’s expansion is to incorporate quiz questions that ask
respondents to identify which parties are in the majority in the US House and
Senate, the parties of their governor, senators, and representatives, and the race
of their representative. These questions are an imperfect measure of political
information, but they are the best objective measures that were available in the
survey.
Methodologically, the only difference between this model and the unified one is
the addition of a third latent dimension, Quiz, that is higher for people who answer
quiz questions incorrectly. We reverse the ‘natural’ direction of a knowledge scale
to simplify visual comparisons between the latent factors and their effects.4 The
primary purpose of this section is to compare the behaviors of the Fear, INR, and
Quiz components of the model.
The same plots will be shown as before, but now we have 3 facets per plot to
capture all the bivariate comparisons between the 3 variables. The demographic
parameters shown in Figure 3.16.
The demographic predictors of Fear and INR in Figure 3.16 have a relationship
very much like the unified model just discussed, and the Quiz predictors show
a remarkably similar pattern. All three of latent predictors have quite similar
patterns of demographic parameters, in that a positive parameter on one dimension
is likely to be positive on all the others, and similarly for negative parameters. One
surprising feature is that the Quiz and Fear parameters are more similar to one
another than Quiz and INR. Quiz is an objective measure—high values are people
who get factual questions wrong– whereas INR and Fear reflect choices made by
respondents. We would expect biases in the choice process to impact Fear and
INR, but not Quiz, and such shared biases would seem to lead to more covariance
in the parameter estimates. The difference here is a bit too noisy to analyze deeply,
4Correct responses to the quiz questions are highly negatively correlated with both Fear and
INR, so flipping the sign makes all the correlations positive to simplify magnitude comparisons,
and it makes the graphs of parameter estimates line up in a much more readable way.
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but it highlights the possibility that Fear may impact INR partially by influencing
information collection about politics.
The Quiz latent variables are more difficult to predict at the individual level
than Fear or INR because there are only 7 binary outcomes on the Quiz dimension.
This is visible in Figure 3.17 by the narrow distribution of individual means on the
Quiz dimension and the width of the red representative uncertainty ellipse on the
Quiz dimension—there is roughly twice as much uncertainty in the Quiz estimates
as in the INR estimates.
Though the parameters for Quiz and Fear were very similar, there is a huge
amount of correlation in unexplained individual variation on Quiz and INR (Figure
3.20 and Table 3.6), and this dominates the parameter-based correlation between
Fear and Quiz when we look at overall correlations in the latent variables (Figure
3.18 and Table 3.5). It appears that there are strong common factors connecting
Quiz and INR beyond the demographic variables included here.
Table 3.5: 95% credible interval bounds of correlations in latent Fear, INR, and
Quiz parameters across draws from posterior
Variables 2.5% Quantile 97.5% Quantile
INR, Fear 0.242 0.325
Quiz, Fear 0.257 0.422
Quiz, INR 0.497 0.652
Table 3.6: 95% credible interval bounds of correlations in individual-specific latent
Fear, INR, and Quiz variation across draws from posterior
Variables 2.5% Quantile 97.5% Quantile
INR, Fear 0.028 0.127
Quiz, Fear 0.026 0.237
Quiz, INR 0.306 0.516
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Figure 3.16: Fitted parameters of the Fear, INR, and Quiz model. The circles
are the joint 40% confidence ellipses for each parameter in each pair of latent
dimensions. 40% ellipses correspond to t = 1, and they are used to avoid excessive
overlap in the visualization. 90% confidence ellipses are about 2.1 times larger,
and 95% ellipses are about 2.4 times larger. The ellipses are based on the mean
and covariance of each parameter’s draws, which is an approximation of the actual
joint distribution of the draws.
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Figure 3.17: Mean latent Fear, INR, and Quiz estimates for each individual. The
dotted red ellipse is a representative 95% joint credible ellipse for an individual at
(0, 0).
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Figure 3.18: Distribution of correlations in latent Fear, INR, and Quiz parameters
across draws from posterior
68
INR Quiz
−2
0
2
−2
0
2
F
e
a
r
IN
R
−2 0 2 −2 0 2
Figure 3.19: Mean individual-specific variation in latent Fear, INR, and Quiz
terms. The dotted red ellipse is a representative 95% joint credible ellipse for an
individual at (0, 0).
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Figure 3.20: Distribution of correlations in individual-specific latent Fear, INR,
and Quiz variation across draws from posterior
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3.3.4 Willingness to admit
The willingness-to-admit model adjust the Fear/INR/Quiz model just discussed to
account for the objective nature of Quiz, and the fact that factual knowledge has a
very specific impact on item nonresponse. Political knowledge determines whether
someone can create an answer they are comfortable with, but biases in willingness
to admit that they do not have a good answer will change their ‘goodness’ threshold
where they choose to skip a question.
This model is more similar to the traditional model discussed earlier in the
paper, except that quiz questions are used rather than a political activity scale.
Also, this model handles missing responses to questions cleanly, so it is possible
to run against all the available data rather than just people who participated in
both rounds of the survey. The traditional model showed varying effects between
genders, so we try to capture those in this model as well.
The willingness-to-admit model uses latent factor variables for Quiz and Fear
(similar to the unified model above, but replacing INR with Quiz), and then it
uses those Quiz and Fear variables to predict the position on INR according to
this specification:
(Fear,Quiz)s ∼ MVN(Zsβ,Σs) (3.8)
INRs ∼ β1Fears + β2Quizs + β3FearsQuizs (3.9)
+ β4FearsGender2 + β5QuizsGender2
+ β6FearsQuizsGender2
+ ǫ, ǫ ∼ N(0, 1)
along with ordinal logit constructions linking Fear, INR, and Quiz to their respec-
tive observable outcomes.
INR does not have demographic predictors in this model, so only the Fear
and Quiz parameters are shown in Figure 3.21. There is less consistency in the
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parameter estimate of Fear and Quiz than we saw in the previous section, and this
is likely because Quiz is now forced to absorb some of INR’s demographic variation.
If we look at the Quiz/INR facet of Figure 3.16, Age and Hisp are more positive
for INR than for Quiz, and when we compare the Quiz/Fear facet in Figure 3.16
with the Figure 3.21, we see that Age and Hisp were the main changes, and both
moved in a positive direction. Whether this movement is a modeling artifact or
a more accurate representation of political knowledge cannot be determined from
the available data, but the changes are relatively small and so that distinction can
be ignored with acceptable risk of misinterpretation.
The other plots of latent variables and their correlations are similar to the
previous model, but with slightly more correlation between INR and the other
terms that follow from the explicit structural connection. The main change in
the plots of individual-specific variations and their correlations is that INR’s noise
is no longer correlated with Fear’s or Quiz’s. This is by construction since the
individual-specific variation on INR is fixed to be independent of the other terms
in Equation 3.9.
Table 3.7: Posterior quantiles of correlations in latent Fear, INR, and Quiz param-
eters across draws from posterior in the willingness-to-admit model
Quantile
Variables 2.5% 5% 50% 95% 97.5%
INR, Fear 0.260 0.267 0.303 0.341 0.347
Quiz, Fear 0.217 0.230 0.311 0.390 0.406
Quiz, INR 0.660 0.676 0.722 0.763 0.769
The key results of interest from the willingness-to-admit model are the effects
of Fear and Quiz on INR from Equation 3.9. Distribution of the raw variables
are shown in Figure 3.26 with quantiles in Table 3.9. The connection to Quiz is
apparent, and a change of 1 in Quiz moves INR by nearly .75. The directions of
other parameters are fairly uncertain, but we will discuss what they suggest. Fear
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Figure 3.21: Fitted parameters of the willingness-to-admit model. The circles
are the joint 40% confidence ellipses for each parameter in each pair of latent
dimensions. 40% ellipses correspond to t = 1, and they are used to avoid excessive
overlap in the visualization. 90% confidence ellipses are about 2.1 times larger,
and 95% ellipses are about 2.4 times larger. The ellipses are based on the mean
and covariance of each parameter’s draws, which is an approximation of the actual
joint distribution of the draws.
73
INR Quiz
−2
0
2
4
−2
0
2
4
F
e
a
r
IN
R
−2 0 2 4 −2 0 2 4
Figure 3.22: Mean latent Fear, INR, and Quiz estimates for each individual in the
willingness-to-admit model. The dotted red ellipse is a representative 95% joint
credible ellipse for an individual at (0, 0).
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Figure 3.23: Distribution of correlations in latent Fear, INR, and Quiz parameters
across draws from posterior in the willingness-to-admit model
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Figure 3.24: Mean individual-specific variation in latent Fear, INR, and Quiz terms
in the willingness-to-admit model. The dotted red ellipse is a representative 95%
joint credible ellipse for an individual at (0, 0).
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Figure 3.25: Distribution of correlations in individual-specific latent Fear, INR,
and Quiz variation across draws from posterior in the willingness-to-admit model
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Table 3.8: Posterior quantiles of correlations in individual-specific latent Fear,
INR, and Quiz variation across draws from posterior in the willingness-to-admit
model
Quantile
Variables 2.5% 5% 50% 95% 97.5%
INR, Fear -0.094 -0.086 -0.030 0.026 0.041
Quiz, Fear -0.067 -0.050 0.061 0.170 0.189
Quiz, INR -0.112 -0.102 -0.050 0.003 0.011
appears to have a small positive effect on INR (more fearful people skipping more
questions), and this effect appears to be strongest for people with less information
(Fear × Quiz likely has a negative effect). There appears to be gender variation
in this interaction, which will be clearer below.
Table 3.9: Posterior quantiles of Fear and Quiz effects on INR in the willingness-
to-admit model
Quantile
Parameter 2.5% 5% 50% 95% 97.5%
Fear -0.075 -0.038 0.096 0.228 0.249
Fear x Fem -0.140 -0.116 -0.008 0.094 0.119
Quiz 0.622 0.647 0.766 0.911 0.938
Quiz x Fem -0.128 -0.112 -0.027 0.054 0.069
Fear x Quiz -0.184 -0.163 -0.068 0.011 0.025
Fear x Quiz x Fem -0.044 -0.029 0.053 0.149 0.165
Comparisons between males and females are difficult in the graph with raw
parameters, so Figure 3.27 and Table 3.10 transform the variables into separate
effects for males and females. The impact of Quiz is apparent for both, and Fear’s
effect has a similar distribution for males and females, but the interaction between
78
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
F
e
a
r
F
e
a
r x F
e
m
Quiz
Quiz x F
e
m
F
e
a
r x Quiz
F
e
a
r x Quiz
x F
e
m
0.0 0.4 0.8
value
de
ns
ity
Figure 3.26: Distributions of Fear and Quiz effects on INR in the willingness-to-
admit model
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Fear and Quiz seems to only impact males—the estimate for females in noisy but
has mean close to 0.
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Figure 3.27: Distributions of Fear and Quiz effects on INR in the willingness-to-
admit model transformed for easier comparisons between males and females
As mentioned before, only Quiz has a clear enough effect to be conclusive, but it
is comforting to see that the interaction that we observed in the traditional model is
reasonably well replicated in a model that is extremely different methodologically.
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Table 3.10: Posterior quantiles of Fear and Quiz effects on INR in the willingness-
to-admit model transformed for easier comparisons between males and females
Quantile
Parameter 2.5% 5% 50% 95% 97.5%
Male Fear -0.075 -0.038 0.096 0.228 0.249
Female Fear -0.143 -0.106 0.087 0.278 0.315
Male Quiz 0.622 0.647 0.766 0.911 0.938
Female Quiz 0.572 0.591 0.740 0.897 0.926
Male Fear x Quiz -0.184 -0.163 -0.068 0.011 0.025
Female Fear x Quiz -0.175 -0.146 -0.011 0.103 0.124
3.4 Conclusions
This paper has covered a very wide range of methods for modeling intuitive con-
structs like “political knowledge”, “self-reported fear” and “likelihood of skipping
questions” that cannot be measured directly by a single question. The traditional
analysis used aggregate scores—simple sums of response values—and then ran a
bundle of nested regressions to build up a story about how fear and item nonre-
sponse are related. It had the benefit of methodological simplicity and familiarity
for readers, but the results were tainted by well-known problems with aggregate
scales.
The latent variable models started from a baseline of IRT modeling, which most
methodologically inclined political scientists have heard of but are not necessarily
familiar with. Despite that, the IRT setup allows for more intuitive models that op-
erate directly on the latent terms that we are interested in—“political knowledge”,
“self-reported fear” and “likelihood of skipping questions”—and so the discussion
can operate on a higher level separate from the complexity and noise of the ordinal
IRT models below.
The latent construction had one unexpected benefit—it found similarities be-
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tween demographic predictors of Fear and Quiz that would almost certainly be
overlooked by a traditional analysis. It also clarified the connection between INR
and Quiz on individual variation separate from demographics, and pointed to the
possibility of omitted variables.
The biggest problem that remained for the latent variable models was the noise
in estimating an individual’s position on the Quiz dimension—uncertainty in an
individual’s estimation blurs them over nearly half the range of mean estimates.
Unfortunately, factual questions are hard to come by in many survey data sets,
including this one, and while the Quiz variable could probably be made more ac-
curate by including participation terms as either predictors or as outcomes on the
Quiz dimension, adding those terms would break the clean “political knowledge”
interpretation and replace it with a fuzzier combination of political knowledge,
political interest, and possibly network effects. The traditional model used a tra-
ditional workaround of just picking political activity as a proxy for knowledge,
while the latent variable analysis used an ‘enlightened’ (or ignorant, depending on
your perspective) approach of accepting the measurement uncertainty and letting
the data say what it can on its own.
In the end, though, the general findings were reasonably similar between the
traditional and latent variable models. Incorrect answers to factual questions and
low activity both increased the likelihood of item nonresponse, fear appeared to
increase INR rates, and there was an interaction between fear, quiz questions (or
activity), and gender. Both modeling strategies were hindered by limitations of
the data, though each was hindered in different ways, and while neither of the
modeling approaches produced particularly strong results, the robustness of the
qualitative interpretations to modeling choices is comforting for the development
of political science. Just as ensembles of predictive models usually perform better
than any single model, explanatory analyses can benefit when we use the full
variety of analysis tools at our disposal.
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Chapter 4
The connection between political and moral
consistency
Our understanding of individual-level political behavior is rooted in notions of
consistency. We ask how consistently group identity, values, wealth, or social con-
nections are able to predict candidate choices, survey responses, campaign contri-
butions, political interest, or turnout. Whenever we fit models of behavior or say
whether one variable affects another—basically, whenever we engage in quantita-
tive political analysis at the level of individuals—we are talking about consistency.
This is particularly true when we try to understand political values. Values
are not directly observable and we are unable to reliably measure them in surveys,
so we instead have to look for patterns across multiple behaviors that could be
explained by some underlying trait, value or belief. The dominant tools tend to
project many observed outcomes onto some low-dimensional space of latent vari-
ables, either through item response theory models, factor analysis, self-reports, or
simple aggregations (Feldman, 1988; Gerber et al., 2010; Kanai et al., 2011; Sni-
derman and Bullock, 2004; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). We sometimes approach
the problem with weak hypotheses about what those latent variables or groups
might be (in the case of item response theory or unrestricted latent class analysis),
and at other times, we have strong a priori hypotheses about the specific variables
in question and seek to test whether the data appears consistent with those hy-
potheses (in the case of aggregations and self-reports). The field has focused on
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these “exploratory vs. confirmatory” questions, discussions about the best linkages
between the latent variables, and analyses of out of sample performance.
Political scientists used to be much more interested in questions of individual
consistency with models—such questions were the focus of The American Voter
(Campbell et al., 1960) and Converse (1964)—but the quantitative literature on
estimation of political values never really caught up with those comparatively
qualitative analyses. Through the long development of ideal point and spatial
preference models, we have been placing everyone on an identical latent space.1
Intuition points in the opposite direction; people vary immensely in how they
parse political questions. Maybe they watch different news outlets and latch on
to different key words in a question or the questions remind them of different
experiences in their past. We treat this inconsistency as a problem to be addressed
through better survey questions or more robust modeling techniques. The spatial
ideology literature does not consider that people vary in their individual adherence
to their underlying values when making choices—or they just have a different set
of underlying value dimensions.
Inconsistency has not always been pushed aside as an annoyance, though. Ever
since Converse (1964) and The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) found
that people do not explicitly structure their choices around abstract ideologies,
researchers have been trying to explain why, then, people do not just behave
randomly. Political scientists set out to understand what factors, often education
or political interest, make people behave consistently over time or in predictable
ways based on demographics or stated beliefs. This line of research tended to
look at one specific policy at a time, and it never examined patterns of individual
consistency that span multiple polices or that link between consistency of policy
choices, values, and behaviors. It also never examined possible links between
consistency in the political domain and consistency in other areas that could shed
light on potential mechanisms by which the consistency is created.
1Latent class analysis is somewhat less restrictive, but still assumes homogeneity in the
goodness-of-fit within groups.
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In terms of methodology, political scientists are able to estimate latent pol-
icy dimensions, and we can characterize consistency on specific policies, but we
are still far from the ideal of simultaneously characterizing both the latent policy
dimensions and the variation in individual adherence to those dimensions. This
chapter attempts to bring us a bit closer to that ideal. I adapt models from the leg-
islative spatial voting literature to simultaneously estimate individual consistency
with a multidimensional spatial voting model and the dimensions underlying that
model. ‘Consistency’ in this model takes on multiple dimensions as well, which
allows people to behave in accordance with some, all, or none of the underlying
values. Unifying our models of consistency and our models of political values can
give us greater insights into the structure of political thoughts and decisions than
either approach alone. I also compare consistency on political dimensions with
consistency on a set of moral dimensions to clarify the extent to which political
consistency is unique or just a facet of a more general psychological phenomenon.
4.1 Consistency
People like to be consistent in how they think and answer questions, or they at
least like to view themselves as consistent people. In the realm of politics, this
could lead them to pick news outlets that agree with their existing views (Iyengar
et al., 2008) or to change their true or stated beliefs to fit group identification or
vice versa (Bafumi, 2009; Gerber et al., 2010), and generally adjust their answers
and behaviors to follow some sort of discernible structure.
But what is “consistent” varies from person to person. Voters vary in their de-
sire and ability to be consistent, or to be perceived as consistent by any particular
observer, and political elites and highly informed or active voters very likely think
about the structure of politics differently and therefore diverge in what it means
to be consistent. From this angle, it is not particularly surprising that Converse
(1964) and The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) found that most people
do not explicitly structure their political ideas and choices around abstract philo-
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sophical ideals, with the general conclusion being that they rely on group identity
instead. But, as the decades since have shown, abstract ideology and group iden-
tity are not the only reasons that voters might end up with a ‘consistent’ set of
policy and voting choices.
Zaller and Feldman (1992) and others have demonstrated that a voter’s consis-
tency tends to increase with their political informedness. Zaller models the voter’s
decision as a the result of a weighted sum of randomly sampled ‘considerations’
that may push a voter for or against a policy. Additional information tends to
increase the number and concordance of considerations that the voter samples in
making their choice, and so they tend to make more consistent choices.
Alvarez and Brehm (1998, 2002) argued for an alternative model that incor-
porated underlying values or beliefs into the voter’s choice. Under perfect infor-
mation, specific policy questions relate to one or more of these underlying values,
but if the relevant values support conflicting answers (ambivalence), additional
information is unlikely to reduce a voter’s variance. If multiple values support
the same choice (equivocation), then additional information will simply make the
voter’s choice clearer, and if the voter simply has little information about the policy
(uncertainty), then additional information will reduce a respondent’s variability,
but not in ways determined by underlying values. (Alvarez and Brehm, 1998)
predicted whether an individual agreed or disagreed with statements about the
IRS (the employees are honest/knowledgeable, the IRS is too intrusive, they never
try to take more money than they should) given opinion metrics based on answers
to other questions about the tax system, the respondent’s interaction with the
IRS, and various demographics. Alvarez and Brehm allowed for structured het-
eroskedasticity conditional on informedness, education, and interactions between
the opinion metrics, and they did find clear evidence of variation in individual
consistency, part of which was due to conflicting preferences, and part of which
was related to informedness or education.
This previous research is more muddled than it might appear. Political sci-
entists have a number of different meanings for voter ‘consistency’: the stability
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of an individual’s answers over time; the predictability of one policy preference
conditional on other preferences; or the predictability of specific policy choices
conditional on underlying values (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). Since the third
definition, predictability conditional on latent values, roughly encompasses the
previous two, that is the type of consistency that I will address in this chapter.
With these multiple definitions in mind, Zaller’s model is most powerful at
explaining why some individuals have more stable survey responses over time than
others: large repeated samplings from a homogenous pool will have low variance;
but it has limited utility in explaining how consideration sets relate to underlying
values. Alvarez and Brehm’s work also addresses individual stability over time
to a certain extent, since underlying values are assumed to be more stable than
information. They attempt to address consistency around underlying values di-
rectly, but by modeling each policy separately, they are forced to use proxies for
underlying values, and so they risk muddling the relationship between uncertainty,
ambivalence, and equivocation with heterogeneity of values within proxy strata.
Perhaps most importantly, none of these models get us closer to understanding
what factors other than informedness might influence political consistency.
All empirical questions about voters’ consistency with underlying values hinges
on being able to estimate or characterize those values in some way. Since The
American Voter clearly ruled out explicit conscious adherence to underlying values,
the only way to get at these underlying values is to measure patterns of observable
behavior. Thus, the main approaches taken in both the legislative voting and
public opinion literature are various forms of factor analysis that either implicitly
or explicitly rely on an spatial model to connect underlying values to specific policy
choices. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) was the foundation for much of the legislative
voting literature, and in the years since, they and others like Heckman and Snyder
(1997) extended their models to include dynamic changes in values, issue-specific
characteristics, and to a certain extent, heteroskedasticity. Jackman (2001) and
Clinton et al. (2004) moved the spatial model to a Bayesian framework based on
multidimensional item-response theory models from psychometrics, which made it
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much simpler to deal with the large number of latent parameters inherent in factor
analysis problems.
Very recently, Lauderdale (2010) extended the Clinton et al. (2004) model to
allow for legislator heteroskedasticity. He terms high-variance legislators ‘maver-
icks’, but they could as easily be called ‘inconsistent’ under the earlier definition
since such legislators do not reliably follow the same set of underlying latent values
that the others do.
In the remainder of the chapter, I demonstrate that Lauderdale’s legislative
estimator can be extended further to model the consistency of survey respondents
with their underlying latent values. I then compare respondents’ consistency on a
set of political questions with their consistency on a set of moral questions and find
evidence of causes other than political informedness that influence how consistent
a voter will be. I do not attempt to address what exactly causes variation in
political and moral consistency, only that there is a relationship between the two.
4.2 Formal and statistical models
Political and moral decisions are both treated as outcomes from separate K-
dimensional spatial where K = 2 for political decision and K = 5 for moral
decisions. Each individual s has an ideal point φs = (φs1, . . . , φsK) in policy space,
and each question q has a policy direction vector λq = (λq1, . . . , λqK), ηq possible
answers, and a set of cutpoints ζq = (ζq1, . . . , ζqηq) that define the breaks between
answers.
I use a simple ordinal logistic model for answers to questions. Individuals map
their ideal points φs onto the question vector λq, then add idiosyncratic noise ǫsq to
get x∗sq, their ideal answer to the question, and finally they choose ysq, the closest
available answer to their ideal answer. Since the questions are all ordinal, we can
define a set of cutpoints that give the midpoints between successive answers, so
for a question with ηq possible answers, we get ηq − 1 cutpoints that define ηq
acceptance intervals. We can thus equivalently say that an individual finds the
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acceptance interval that contains their ideal answer, and they then choose the
corresponding available answer.
Formally, this can be written
x∗sq = λq · φs + ǫsq (4.1)
ysq =


1 , x∗sq < ζq1
...
i , ζq,i−1 ≤ x∗sq < ζq,i
...
ηq , ζqηq ≤ x∗sq
(4.2)
where φs does not include a constant term.
The arrangement so far is very similar to those used in legislative voting analy-
ses like Clinton et al. (2004) except that this version allows for ordinal rather than
only binary decisions.
The key difference comes with how ǫsq is parameterized. I allow for het-
eroskedasticity across individuals in the idiosyncratic noise terms:
ǫsq ∼ Logistic(0, σg(q)s ) iid over q, s (4.3)
(σps , σ
m
s ) ∼ LogNormal(Zγ,Σσ) (4.4)
where g(q) denotes whether question q is a political or moral question, and σp and
σm are the political and moral heteroskedasticity terms. Z = (z1, ...zD) is a matrix
of demographic predictors where each column has been centered to have mean 0
(and in practice, scaled to have standard deviation 1). Compared to models with
question-specific heteroskedasticity, this arrangement greatly reduces the dimen-
sionality of the heteroskedasticity term and aids general interpretation of overall
consistency rather than question-specific consistency. Note that this arrangement
is very similar to the heteroskedastic one-dimensional legislative voting model of
Lauderdale (2010) but applied to ordinal data and extended to multiple dimensions
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of preferences and heteroskedasticity.
Finally, φs and Σs are influenced in the model by hierarchical covariates:
φs ∼ MVN(Zβ,Σφ) iid over s (4.5)
Σφ ∼Wishart(I, 14) (4.6)
where Σs allows for covariance between the political and moral dimensions, and
the degrees of freedom parameter is twice the total dimensionality of the latent
space and provides moderate shrinkage towards the identity matrix.2 The value
of any particular φs is not of much interest to us, as it’s just the estimate for one
specific individual, so they are effectively nuisance parameters in the model. As
we will see later, we can differentiate some individuals’ values of φs from others,
but the real interest is in the group-level values of β and Σφ.
Identification of latent ideal point models depends on fixing some of the latent
parameters to define the scaling and rotation of the latent space (Clinton et al.,
2004; Jackman, 2001; Rivers, 2003). Legislative ideal point models usually fix
the latent space by fixing the ideal points of a few legislators, with the number
depending on the policy space’s dimensionality. That is not possible here since
the data comes from a random sample of voters and there is no prior information
about individual voter preferences.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that the moral questions were de-
signed to have a factor structure that can be identified easily through constraints
on question parameters but no orthogonality constraints in the latent space. The
political questions, on the other hand, have no such predetermined structure and
are easiest to interpret with orthogonal dimensions. The sampler can operate with-
out strict orthogonality on the political space, but if the two political dimensions
become too correlated, the sampler can hit regions of numerical instability. To
avoid this, I allow correlation in the political dimensions within the sampler, but
2These parameters create a fairly sharp drop-off in the prior likelihood of correlations over 0.5
between dimensions.
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I add a penalty term to such correlations (which hurts mixing slightly but does
not bias the results), and then run the actual orthogonalizations after sampling is
complete. This takes care of orthogonalization, but we still need to pin down the
political dimensions’ scale and rotation.
I fix the relative scaling of ζ and φ by standardizing the noise term of φ to
mean 0 and identity variance. I also constrain the political questions to have
weight 0 on all moral dimensions, and vice versa, and while the directions of moral
questions are specified a priori, those of political questions are not. Instead, I run
the sampler on a version of the model that does not identify the political space’s
rotation, and then I apply Procrustes rotations to the political φ drawn in each
sample to align them to a common space across all samples. Finally, I manually
rotate the political dimensions to simplify discussion.
The final step in identification is checking the cutpoints ζ. The scaling of φ is
fixed to mean 0 and variance 1 on each dimension, so if we leave λ unconstrained,
it is sufficient to check that the mean and scale of ǫsq are both fixed. The mean
of ǫsq is constrained since it is normally distributed with mean 0, and the scale is
constrained because the log standard deviation of ǫsq has mean 0 across individuals.
Note that the identification restrictions in latent parameters are distinct from
assumptions in that it is possible to transform draws taken from the posterior
distribution of this model into draws from the posterior of models with other
identification restrictions. In other words, the identification restrictions should be
thought of as definitions that make it possible to compare points in latent space,
but not as informative restrictions on the model.
4.3 Data
All data used in this chapter comes from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional
Election Survey (CCES), an internet survey run by Polimetrix over a representative
sample of US voters. The CCES includes two rounds, one before the 2010 election
and one after, and in each round, respondents answer a set of common questions
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followed by a set of questions from a team module. There were 46 teams, each of
which was assigned 1000 or more unique respondents. In this analysis, I use the
results from the Caltech and New York University modules, which both included
the battery of moral questions. All questions are ordinal or are transformed into
ordinal variables, so they all fit immediately into the model presented above. The
actual political questions are listed in Appendix A. Moral questions come from
the 30-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), and each
respondent was randomly assigned one of three subsets the questions in order to
reduce the length of the survey.
4.4 Results
The results are broken into two sections. The first section fits a model without
heteroskedasticity, and the second section fits a model with heteroskedasticity.
While the second model is the main focus of the chapter, the first model provides
a basis for comparing the fitted latent spaces. The purpose of this example is
to demonstrate the performance of the estimation methodology on a real-world
data set, and here it is a primarily descriptive exercise. With that in mind, I will
not analyze the specific findings of the model very deeply. The discussion below
will focus on the performance of the model for differentiating people and groups
in ideological space and in their consistency, not on the specific impacts of any
particular demographic.
4.4.1 Model without heteroskedasticity
The model without heteroskedasticity fixes the (σps , σms ) terms to (1, 1) for everyone
but is otherwise identical to the heteroskedastic model developed above. The model
was coded in Stan, and I started with a series of tuning steps to get the sampler into
the ‘meat’ of the posterior, and then ran Stan on four chains with 50 adaptation
steps and 200 samples each. The chain length is much lower than would be required
for hierarchical IRT models that use Gibbs sampling or Metropolis-Hastings, but
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Table 4.1: Demographic variable descriptions
Variable Description
Unins Respondent is uninsured
UnionHouse Someone in household is or was a union member
UnionSelf Respondent is or was a union member
Rent Respondent rents their home
Income Ordered income bins (treated as continuous)
Pray Frequency of prayer
Church Frequency of church attendance
Marr Respondent is married
Educ Education bins (treated as continuous)
RaceO Race other than non-Hispanic White or Black
Hisp Hispanic
Ret Respondent is retired
NoFT Respondent does not have a full-time job
Fem Female
Black Race is Black
BornAg Born-again Christian
the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithm that Stan uses walks across the posterior
several orders of magnitude more efficiently, so 200 samples per chain produce
good mixing.
There are three outputs of interest: the hierarchical effects of demographics
on ideal points, distributions of each individual’s ideal points, and the moral and
political question loadings.
The goal of this chapter is not to dig into the predictors of political and moral
opinions, so the main point to take from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is that the model is
does estimate the demographic predictors with enough precision to make meaning-
ful group-level claims, and the demographic predictors fall onto a reasonable set
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Figure 4.1: Effects of demographic parameters on political ideal points in model
without heteroskedasticity. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect
estimates (roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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Figure 4.2: Effects of demographic parameters on moral ideal points in the model
without heteroskedasticity. Error bars are stepped at 60%, 80%, and 95% levels.
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of dimensions. Income and NoFT have effects on primarily the (P1−P2) diagonal,
as do most of the demographics, while Church, Pray, and Black spread away from
this diagonal. For descriptions of the variable definitions, see 4.1.
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Figure 4.3: Scatterplots of a sample of the fitted ideal point in the model without
heteroskedasticity. Red dotted ellipses denote the 95% confidence ellipse for the
ideal point of a hypothetical individual at 0.
The plots of ideal points in Figure 4.3 show that the model is differentiating
individuals reasonably well (note that the red circles are 95% ellipses, so people
at opposite edges are quite well differentiated), but that there is relatively more
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uncertainty on the moral than on the political dimensions when we try to estimate
an individual’s position.
Finally, the factor loadings in Figure 4.4 shows that we have a good distri-
bution of political questions that are informative about different directions in the
ideological space. The specific effects are not of interest here and with 196 vari-
ables, there are far too many to discuss. The mass of large, thin ellipses also shows
that there are many questions that did not have reliable factor loadings (usually
because they are only asked to small subsets of respondents), but there are enough
well-estimated loadings to differentiate people well.
The moral loadings in Figure 4.5 split up the moral questions by their dimen-
sions as defined by the MFQ30, though while the standard method of scoring the
MFQ30 places equal weight on every question, we see a very wide variation in the
loadings within each dimension. Again, this is not the focus of this chapter, so it
will not be discussed in detail.
4.4.2 Heteroskedastic model
Like the homoskedastic model, the heteroskedastic model was coded in Stan, and
I started with similar set of tuning steps, and then ran Stan on four chains with
50 adaptation steps and 200 samples each. The chains showed good mixing during
the sampling stage.
There are a few substantial changes in the demographic predictors in Figure 4.6
compared to the homoskedastic version in Figure 4.1. NoFT now impacts P2 more
negatively, and Church, Fem, and Pray have a more negative impact on P1. These
movements will tend to be in the direction of low-heteroskedasticity individuals
with high values of the parameter, so if the low-heteroskedasticity non-full-time
workers are low on the P2 dimension, that will tend to pull the new estimate of
NoFT downwards.
There are no substantial relative differences in the effects of demographics
between the heteroskedastic model (Figure 4.7) and homoskedastic model (Figure
4.2). The heteroskedastic model deflates the scale of all the effects by roughly
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Figure 4.4: Loadings of the political questions on the factor dimensions in the
model without heteroskedasticity. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the
loading estimates (roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation). Some highly
uncertain estimates are displayed with thin lines to avoid completely masking
questions with weak loadings.
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Figure 4.5: Loadings of the moral questions on their corresponding factor dimen-
sions in the model without heteroskedasticity. Each moral question loads on only
one dimension. Error bars are stepped at 60%, 80%, and 95% levels.
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Figure 4.6: Effects of demographic parameters on political ideal points in the het-
eroskedastic model. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect estimates
(roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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Figure 4.7: Effects of demographic parameters on moral ideal points in the het-
eroskedastic model. Error bars are stepped at 60%, 80%, and 95% levels.
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30%, but that is primarily an artifact of the heteroskedasticity identification choice
(mean log σ at 0) rather than a more complicated identification choice that would
preserve the average scaling.
The changes are a bit easier to see in Figure 4.8, which directly compares the
mean estimates of demographic effects on ideal points calculated by each model.
There are definitely changes in the estimated factor structure between the two
models, but they are relatively minor.
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Figure 4.8: Mean posterior effects of demographic parameters on ideal points in
the heteroskedastic versus the homoskedastic model
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Figure 4.9: Scatterplots of a sample of the fitted ideal point in the heteroskedastic
model. Red dotted ellipses denote the 95% confidence ellipse for the ideal point of
a hypothetical individual at 0.
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In terms of predicted ideal points, the heteroskedastic model (Figure 4.9)
slightly increases the uncertainty in individual ideal point estimates compared to
the homoskedastic model (Figure 4.3), but otherwise does not substantially change
the qualitative properties of the ideal point estimates.
The political loadings in Figure 4.10 still show a good range of question direc-
tions, though the positions of some individual questions have moved substantially
relative to the homoskedastic model (Figure 4.4), but there are too many questions
to analyze in detail.
Adding heteroskedasticity to the model brings the moral factor loadings closer
to their traditional scoring weights. Questions 27 and 15 are still outliers on their
dimensions, but the other questions are closer together on each dimension in Figure
4.11 compared to Figure 4.5.
Finally, we move to the predictors of heteroskedasticity and the patterns of
individual heteroskedasticity (Figure 4.12). The model clearly differentiates the
effects of different demographics. The two largest effects on the political dimen-
sion were from NoFT, Income and Black. Looking back at Figure 4.8, we see
that the effects of NoFT, Black on ideal points have more variation between the
homoskedastic models than other variables. I hinted at this relationship earlier,
but now the connection between movement of a parameter’s ideal point effect and
the parameter’s effect of heteroskedasticity is readily visible.
On the moral dimensions, Pray and Black have the largest effects on moral
heteroskedasticity. Looking at Figure 4.8, we see that they do shift more than
the other variables, but particularly so on the Ingroup, Authority, and Purity
dimensions.
Finally, we can move to the connection between political and moral heteroskedas-
ticity. The only variable that has substantial loadings on both dimensions is
Black—in that African American respondents tend to answer political questions
more consistently with the 2-dimensional framework, and they tend to also answer
the moral questions more consistently with the 5-factor model from the MFQ30.
There is also a connection outside of the demographics included in the model.
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heteroskedastic model. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the loading
estimates (roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation). Some highly uncertain
estimates are displayed with thin lines to avoid completely masking questions with
weak loadings.
105
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
26
21
16
11
6
1
27
22
17
12
7
2
28
23
18
13
8
3
29
24
19
14
9
4
30
25
20
15
10
5
M
1−H
arm
M
2−F
airn
e
ss
M
3−Ingroup
M
4−A
uthority
M
5−Purity
0 1 2 3 4
value
Qu
es
tio
n 
in 
M
FQ
30
Figure 4.11: Loadings of the moral questions on their corresponding factor di-
mensions in the heteroskedastic model. Each moral question loads on only one
dimension. Error bars are stepped at 60%, 80%, and 95% levels.
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Figure 4.12: Effects of demographic variables on log σ of the political and moral
spaces. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the loading estimates (roughly
comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of mean posterior log σ for a sample of individuals. The
red dotted 95% ellipse shows the uncertainty in estimates for a representative
individual at the origin.
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The political and moral individual-specific noise terms on log σ were roughly be-
tween 0.07 and .25, so there is definitely room for more work to tease apart the
missing determinants of high-level consistency in survey responses.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter had two purposes: to understand the extent to which ‘consistent’
political ideology is specific to politics rather than part of a more general effect,
and to construct a modeling method that allows us to jointly estimate positions
in an latent space as well as consistency with that space.
On the latter, this chapter has clearly succeeded. The modeling method is
tractable in real-world surveys, and it can differentiate people and groups in terms
of their ideal points and levels of consistency. There is no evidence that the in-
troduction of heteroskedasticity produces intractable posterior likelihoods or other
vast departures from the standard world of ideal point modeling—the differences in
the models shown here are just among specific groups that the standard modeling
approaches fit poorly.
In terms of understanding the nature of political consistency, this chapter is
less conclusive. There is definitely a component of political consistency that is
connected to moral consistency, and this chapter shows that a connection exists in
some demographic parameters and in the individual-level variation not explained
by demographics, but the roots of the correlated noise are unknown.
For future applications, there are two key benefits to this model. It produces
reasonably tight estimates of demographic effects on heteroskedasticity, which
mean that more demographic predictors can be tested in observational work. Sec-
ond, it opens the door to experimental manipulations of consistency. If random
treatments applied in a survey experiment, the treatment term can be added as a
hierarchical parameter to estimate a causal impact of the treatment on consistency,
and that will pin down the actual causal factors underlying political consistency
much more clearly than any observational study.
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Finally, the key benefit of the model is that it places a hierarchical structure on
political consistency and provides multiple options for linking political consistency
other features of interest through the Σσ matrix, by adding hierarhical covariates
to Z, or by completely replacing the construction in Equation 4.4 with some other
parameterization that may be more appropriate for a specific analysis. That link-
age is extremely flexible, so the model provides an straightforward path to directly
relate political consistency to a wide variety of other traits or behaviors.
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Chapter 5
Multidimensional salience in a model of
spatial ideology
People care about different things in politics, and when they are asked a question,
each individual may process it differently or call on different memories and ideas
when formulating their response. In the political science literature, this hetero-
geneity is usually described as salience—memories, ideas, considerations, or choice
features that an individual is likely to apply in their decision are considered more
salient.
In the universe of spatial ideal point models of ideology, salience takes on a more
specific meaning—the weights that people apply to various preference dimensions
when making their choices. To the extent that ‘memories and ideas’ drive peoples’
positions on these dimensions and the likelihood that they will use a particular
dimension when making a political choice, the spatial model definition meshes
reasonably nicely with the more general definition.
Formal models of voter choice and party strategy capture salience is a very
compact and high-level way. Individuals have ideal points in a policy space, they
are faced with possible outcomes in the policy space, and their utility of each
outcome depends on the salience-weighted distance between their ideal point and
the policy of interest. See Hinich and Munger (1997) for a more extensive discus-
sion. Unfortunately, the existing techniques for spatial ideal point estimation are
poorly suited to the analysis of survey data, and existing techniques for modeling
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‘salience’ do not operate on the same latent space as salience in formal models.
In applied research on voter choices, ‘salience’ is almost always related to very
specific ideas, considerations, or features of a model. For example, Transue (2007)
emphasizes racial identity and examines how that impacts issue preferences. Ger-
ber et al. (2010) emphasizes party identity in a field experiment and examines
how that impacts attitudes. Outside political ideology to the related literature
on latent moral preferences, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) demonstrate that mortality
salience impacts how people punish others who violate norms.
These applications are extremely specific, and do not relate directly to high-
level summaries of political ideology. The disconnect is apparent in the conclusion
of Transue (2007), where the author attempts to connect the specific policy-specific
findings to more general psychological and political theories. That connection is
desirable, since it is much easier for us to think about a few dimensions of ideology
rather than the thousands of possible policy dimensions, but so far, there has
been no way to connect observable outcomes to the salience of these dimensions
to individuals or groups.
Spatial ideal point estimation procedures almost never allow for individual
variation in the underlying space (Clinton et al., 2004; Martin and Quinn, 2002;
Peress, 2009; Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), though Lauderdale (2010) is a recent
exception that lets legislators vary in their consistency with the latent space as
a whole, but not with specific dimensions or along diagonals. Very few estima-
tion methods allow for demographic predictors of ideal points that are extremely
important for analyzing voter behavior where we have a limited number of obser-
vations per individual and are primarily interested in group-level effects (though
see Martin et al., 2011, for a 1-dimensional exception).
Other researchers have looked at voter heterogeneity directly, but have taken
the latent space as fixed. Rivers (1988) uses voters’ self-reported ideology and
partisanship and rank-ordered ratings of politicians as inputs, and examines how
voters vary in how they appear to weight partisanship versus ideology. The down-
sides of this analysis are that the salience parameterization requires no interaction
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between ideology and partisanship, and it does not produce a latent space that is
at all comparable to legislative models (which were still in their infancy in 1988), so
there is no way to link the results of Rivers (1988) with legislative behavior. More
recently, Glasgow (2001) examined British voter choices among multiple parties
given fixed and known ideal points, but allows voter heterogeneity through ran-
dom coefficients on the impact of social class. As with the examples of ‘salience’
research described above, the heterogeneity is extremely structured and limited.
This chapter attempts to bridge the gap between the estimation of ideal points
and ideological space and the estimation of salience in that ideological space. I
build on constructions of ideology from the formal literature and I also build on
the ideal point estimation techniques from the legislative and judicial voting lit-
eratures, to produce an intuitively interpretable and reasonably practical (though
computationally intensive) method for simultaneously estimating ideal points and
salience with hierarchical predictors from survey data. Unlike the existing ideal
point estimation models, I allow the latent space to be ‘warped’ by an individual’s
salience matrix, and since the focus is on demographic groups rather than specific
individuals, I also include hierarchical predictors of both ideal points and salience.
Unlike past literature on voter heterogeneity, the model does not require an a pri-
ori fixed structure on the latent space and does not require that individual ideal
points be known with certainty.
In the end, the procedure developed here produces group- and individual-level
estimates of ideal points and salience that can drop directly into formal models
like those in Hinich and Munger (1997). This allows researchers to finally test
some of the models’ predictions, and to the extent that the formal models hold,
this model opens up new empirical avenues for understanding how parties select
platforms, decide what to emphasize, choose who to target, and react to changes
in voter preferences.
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5.1 Building up a statistical model with salience
The aim of this chapter is to develop a link between formal models of issue salience
and measureable data. The primary consideration is minimizing changes required
at each end of the link—finding a construction of the statistical model that varies
as little as possible from standard estimation techniques, but that also produces
parameters that can drop cleanly into formal models.
There is some variation in the notation used for IRT models in political science,
so to avoid confusion, Table 5.1 defines the basic IRT notation that I will use.
In most multidimensional IRT models of political choices, each question has a
direction vector λ and a set of cutpoints ζ, and each individual has an ideal point
φ. The ordinal answers are given by y, and a linear latent term is given by y∗.
The basic decision process follows like this1.
y∗ = φλ+ ǫ , ǫ ∼ Normal(0, 1) (5.1)
or equivalently y∗ =
(
φ+
ǫ
‖λ‖
)
λ , ǫ ∼ MVN(0, I) (5.2)
and then y = 1 +
∑
j
{y∗ < ζj} (5.3)
The equivalence of the 5.1 and 5.2 is shown in more detail in Appendix B.1. The
intuition behind this model is that a low-dimensional ideological space summarizes
basic patterns of policy preferences in the population. A particular individual has
an ideal ‘summary’ policy bundle represented by a point in this low-dimensional
space. Their answers to particular question are based on their summary policy
plus some question-specific variation that is not captured by the summary policy.
Note that in this construction, everyone employs the same ‘summary’ space
when considering policies, and question-specific variation is highly constrained—
independent and homoskedastic—and those constraints may not reasonably cap-
1There are several other decision processes that produce observationally equivalent outcomes,
but this notation will simplify later discussions.
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Table 5.1: Model notation
s index of the ‘subject’ or person
q index of a specific question or choice
φs s’s ideal point in the latent ideological space
y∗sq s’s ideal response on the single-dimensional choice line for
question q
ysq s’s actual response or choice on question q, indexed from 1
Jq the number of possible responses to question q minus 1, which
is the number of cutpoints in an ordinal model
ζqj the position of the jth cutpoint on the single-dimensional
choice line for question q
λq a nonzero vector that maps the ideal points onto question
dimensions
As the salience weighting matrix for subject s
ǫsq the question-specific random noise used by subject s when
answering question q
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ture political thought.
5.1.1 Linking IRT and formal models
The most basic formal models that employ spatial voter preferences treat ideal
points as common knowledge, use a common policy space shared by everyone, and
treat the voter choices as perfect optimizations based on euclidean distance in the
policy space—meaning that voters have discrete or intentionally mixed strategies,
but they do not have any random noise added in to their decisions.
Policy space
Importantly, the ‘common policy space’ in the formal models is pre-defined. There
is no uncertainty in the spatial parameters. In the statistical domain, this corre-
sponds to confirmatory factor analyses that define a few policy dimensions, assign
questions to each dimension, and then try to fit ideal points and other parameters
into the pre-defined space. However, the assignment of policy dimensions is always
somewhat ad hoc (or it would be exploratory factor analysis) and subject to biases
on the part of the analyst.
Because there is generally to little information available to pre-assign the policy
dimensions to questions, the legislative and judicial voting literatures have tended
towards exploratory models that do not constrain the policy space more than
needed for statistical identification. I view this as a wise choice, and so the linkage
between formal and statistical models I develop here is based more on exploratory
and less on confirmatory factor analyses.
Hyperplanes versus outcome positions
The next hurdle to be addressed is the nature of voter choices. Formal models of
voter choice usually define options as outcome positions in policy space, and voters
want to obtain the policy outcome closest to their ideal point.
Formally, those models define outcomes νqj that fall along a line defined by
vectors ανq and λq with α
ν
q · λq = 0 and positions on that line defined by scalars
117
γνqj .
j ∈ {1, . . . , Jq + 1} (5.4)
νqj = α
ν
q + λqγ
ν
qj (5.5)
y = argmin
j∈{1,...,Jq+1}
(xsq − νqj)T(xs − νqj) (5.6)
IRT models, on the other hand, use hyperplanes to split the space into groups
with different question-specific preferences xsq = φs+
ǫsq
‖λs‖
. These formulations can
be observationally equivalent for binary and ordinal choices with up to 4 options—
meaning given a set of hyperplanes, we can construct policy outcomes such that the
voters between two hyperplanes are closer to the corresponding outcome position
than to any other outcome position.
When the number of choices is 5 or higher—meaning there are 4 or more
hyperplanes—it is possible to have hyperplanes that split the cloud of voter pref-
erences in ways that are impossible to obtain from outcome positions alone.2 We
can, however, represent a model that uses ordered outcome positions with a hy-
perplane construction by constructing hyperplanes perpendicular to the line of
outcome positions that intersect the line at the midpoints between neighboring
outcomes.
Thus, any data that can be represented by outcome positions can be repre-
sented equally well, if not better, by hyperplanes, and so I will use a hyperplane
representation in the modeling. To the extent that the model’s fitted parameters
can be represented by outcome positions, if we want to analyze questions in terms
of their outcome positions, it is possible to translate fitted hyperplanes into a set
of policy outcomes for each question. So when the policy outcome construction is
reasonable in light of observed data, we can calculate the outcome positions, but
when the data is inconsistent with outcome points, the model is not constrained.
2Example: with unidimensional space, put cutpoints at −1.1, −1, 1, and 1.1. There is no point
ζ such that ‖ζ − (−1)‖ < 0.1 and ‖ζ − 1‖ < 0.1, so there is no way that distance minimization
can make the central region wide enough relative to the width of the neighboring regions
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Before moving on, I should note that with choice-specific utility noise, it is
possible to represent any set of hyperplanes, but that nearly doubles the degrees
of freedom per choice and greatly complicates identification. Such a setup might be
useful in ex-post conversion from hyperplanes to ideal points, but it is not helpful
within the model itself.
Noise parameterization
In formal models, random variation in voter choices is either ignored in the model,
or it usually enters as outcome-specific biases that behave like the noise term in
multinomial logit. In binary and ordinal IRT models, noise enters the voter choice
as a bias on the question-specific latent term (y∗ in this chapter’s notation). In
the MNL-style formal models, if we hold all other parameters fixed, increasing the
amount of noise in the model will shift all outcome probabilities monotonically
towards a uniform distribution. In ordinal probit models used in IRT, extremely
high levels of noise will shift the outcome probabilities towards the extreme values
and away from middle options, but at moderate levels of noise, the impact on
outcome probabilities is non-monotonic. As noise variance increases, nearby inte-
rior options can rise in probability at first, but then fall as the variance increases
enough to shift all the probability towards the extreme options.
In the models developed here, I base the noise parameterization on a traditional
ordinal IRT construction and only modify when necessary to introduce salience into
the model. This is the standard method used in the limited literature on political
ideal point estimation with ordinal data, but there is no principled reason to assume
that the IRT construction of noise is superior to MNL-style biases. Optimal noise
parameterization is an empirical question that merits further research, but it is
outside the scope of this chapter, and so I stick to the standard, though possibly
imperfect, parameterization.
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5.1.2 Adding in Salience
In formal models that use outcome policy positions, salience enters in the distance
calculation. For a positive definite salience matrix As, ideal point φs, and policy
outcomes ν1, . . . , νJq , we just make a slight tweak to Equation 5.6:
νqj = α
ν
q + λqγ
ν
qj
y = argmin
j∈{1,...,Jq+1}
(xs − νqj)TAs(xs − νqj) (5.7)
As we have discussed, when A = I, the parameterization in terms of outcome
policies ν is a constrained version of a hyperplane model. We do not want to
force those constraints just so that we can model salience, so we must instead
find a parameterization of salience that works in the hyperplane representation.
To do this, I will first parameterize 5.7 in terms of hyperplanes, and then see
what adjustments (if any) need to be made so that the hyperplane version can be
unconstrained.
We will look at the simplest case for optimization. We have two outcomes
points ν1 and ν2, and we want to find the hyperplane that splits the space of
xs according to their optimal outcome. For simplicity, I will drop some constant
subscripts in this derivation. The values on the hyperplane z satisfy
(z − ν1)TA(z − ν1) = (z − ν2)TA(z − ν2), (5.8)
and since A is positive definite, we can find a square root matrix with the same
eigenvectors using an eigendecomposition:
A = QΛQT (5.9)
B = QΛ1/2QT (5.10)
where Q is an orthonormal matrix, Λ is a diagonal matrix of positive eigenvalues,
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and Λ1/2 is a diagonal matrix of the square roots of the eigenvalues.3 Then B is
positive definite and has the property that
A = BTB = BBT. (5.11)
We substitute BTB for A in equation 5.8 to get
(z − ν1)TBTB(z − ν1) = (z − ν2)TBTB(z − ν2) (5.12)
(Bz −Bν1)T(Bz −Bν1) = (Bz −Bν2)T(Bz −Bν2) (5.13)
which is straightforward to solve in terms of Bz:
Bz =
Bν1 +Bν2
2
+ C (5.14)
where
C · (Bν1 −Bν2) = 0. (5.15)
Since ν1 − ν2 is proportional to λ as defined in Equation 5.5, (Bν1 − Bν2) is
proportional to Bλ, and so the hyperplanes must be of the form
zTBλ = constant (5.16)
To find the constant, all we have to do is calculate the value under the z for which
3A more common ‘matrix square root’ is the Cholesky decomposition, but the Cholesky de-
composition is not positive definite, nor does it preserve eigenvalues, so it can rotate and skew
the space rather than simply scaling it along set dimensions. Also, the computations involved
in fitting the model primarily calculate A from B rather than the reverse, so this particular
eigendecomposition is not actually costly in terms of computation.
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C = 0 in Equation 5.14, which I will denote by z0.
z0 = B−1
(
Bν1 +Bν2
2
)
(5.17)
=
ν1 + ν2
2
(5.18)
and we can then punch in z0 to solve for the constant in 5.16
(z0)TBλ =
(
ν1 + ν2
2
)T
Bλ (5.19)
=
(
α+ λγ1 + α+ λγ2
2
)T
Bλ (5.20)
=
(
α+ λ
γ1 + γ2
2
)T
Bλ (5.21)
Note that the α term cannot be reduced away; while αTλ = 0 by definition, it is
not generally true that αTBλ = 0. And since theB terms vary between individuals,
the ‘constant’ on the right hand side is not the same for each individual.
This highlights the fact that nonuniform salience removes the ‘perpendicular
shift invariance’ property described in Appendix B.2. That means that aside from
any parameters that determine As itself, we also double the number of parameters
associated with each question. Now rather than just having a direction, each
question has a direction and an origin.
But we can simplify this slightly.
(
α+ λγ1+γ22
)
can just be written as (α+λ∗ηj)
with scalar η for each cutpoint (which is now a point in latent space rather than
a point on the real line). Much like the outcome points, these cutpoints fall on a
line in the latent space, but the cutpoint construction again offers more flexibility
in the positioning of slicing hyperplanes just as they did in the version without
salience.
The final task is to translate back from hyperplanes into a model structure like
equations 5.2 and 5.3.
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y∗sq =
(
φs +
ǫsq
‖λ‖
)
Bsλq, ǫsq ∼ MVN(0, I) (5.22)
and then ysq = 1 +
∑
j
{
y∗sq < (αq + λq ∗ ηqj)TBsλq
}
(5.23)
5.1.3 Noise parameterization
Most IRT models assume homoskedastic latent errors, but the salience construction
above introduces structured heteroskedasticity that needs to be examined before
we move forward. Equation 5.22 can be rewritten as
y∗sq = φsBsλq +
ǫsqBsλq
‖λ‖ , ǫsq ∼ MVN(0, I) (5.24)
and then the noise term is distributed as
ǫsqBsλq
‖λ‖ ∼ Normal
(
0,
λTBTs Bsλ
‖λ‖2
)
(5.25)
∼ Normal
(
0,
λTAsλ
‖λ‖2
)
(5.26)
and the cutpoint transformation can be expanded similarly
(αq + λq ∗ ηqj)TBsλq = αqBsλq︸ ︷︷ ︸
shift
+λTq Bλq︸ ︷︷ ︸
scaling
ηqj (5.27)
We want to compare the scaling term in Equation 5.27 with the variance in 5.26,
both of which are scalars. In the simplest case, where As is the identity matrix,
the variance in 5.26 equals 1, and the scaling term in 5.27 is equal to ‖λ‖2. As we
move away from As = I, the variance of the noise in 5.26 increases proportionally
with the As-weighted length of λq. The scale term increases proportionally to the
Bs-weighted length of λq. Even though the eigenvectors of As and Bs are the
same by construction, there is not a simple linear relationship between λTq Aλq and
λTq Bλq.
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To illustrate this, examine a simple 2-dimensional case with
A =

 s 0
0 1

 B =

 √s 0
0 1


λ1 =

 1
1

 λ2 =

 1
0

 λ3 =

 0
1


where s is an extra term to illustrate what happens as A moves away from I. As
s increases, the scaling terms λTq Aλq and λ
T
q Bλq vary as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Changes in error standard deviation and cutpoint scaling terms as the
salience matrix moves away from the identity matrix
To a very rough approximation, increases in salience in the direction of or
perpendicular to λq do not have a large impact on the noise in the question-specific
ordinal model. When λ is in between parallel and perpendicular to the salience
changes, movement away from I acts like a very slight increase in the noise of the
question-specific ordinal model, but the effect is only apparent at rather extreme
salience weights. That does not mean that salience has no impact on the model,
just that its primary effect will often be through the shift term in Equation 5.27.
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Figure 5.2: Change in ratio of error standard deviation to cutpoint scaling terms
as the salience matrix moves away from the identity matrix
If additional flexibility is desired in the model, a natural place to add it is in
this noise parameterization term—while the parameterization in this chapter does
not substantially vary the ordinal model’s noise term, we might want it to. For
example, if we think that people near extremes on particular dimensions would
collect more information relating policies to those dimensions, then they might
have very clear opinions on policy questions that lie on their ‘favorite’ dimension
and would have lower noise in their question-specific ordinal model. That sort of
extension is left for future work, however, and this chapter focuses on developing
the basic model.
5.1.4 Hierarchical modeling of salience matrices
With a relatively small number of noisy observations per individual, non-hierarchical
estimates of ideal points can be quite noisy, and individual-level estimates of
salience are even more disconnected from actual observable data. Furthermore,
since we are more interested in group-level and population-level variation than in
125
the positions of specific survey repspondents, we need a hierarchical structure to
determine what patterns of salience exist in the population as a whole.
Unfortunately, there are no directly applicable models for us to use here. Other
fields that use hierarchical models of positive definite matrices usually focus on
shrinking submatrices towards a shared ‘parent’ matrix or towards a particular
global structure. Here our problem is different—we want to use a set of continuous
variables to predict an individual’s salience matrix, but we do not have a nested
structure to our data or other ‘parent’ matrix that might apply. So, we need to
design our own modeling technique for positive definite matrices.
The first place to start is in determining what properties we need from a hier-
archical model of salience matrices:
• Salience matrices should be positive definite
• Reordering demographic predictors should have no impact on the resulting
salience matrices
• Removing a demographic predictor from the model should have the same
impact as having a ‘zero’ parameter for that predictor, where ‘zero’ remains
to be defined
• Demographic predictors should not have to impact the same set of eigenvec-
tors, etc.
• Demographic predictors should be able to increase or decrease salience in
any direction
Order invariance is a particularly difficult property to obtain since very few
operations on matrices are commutative. Matrix addition does commute, but
the sum of positive definite salience matrices has strictly greater salience on all
dimensions than any of its components, and so simple addition of matrices will
not let demographic predictors decrease salience on a specific dimension. Yet
order invariance is one of the most important elements of this model. Without it,
we have no simple way of interpreting the results, since the interpretation of each
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demographic’s effects depends on the effects of all the other demographics in the
model and the sequence in which they are included in the model. It also greatly
complicates the construction of priors since priors that are reasonable when only
one demographic is included in the model may have very different meanings when
other demographics are added.
For example, one naive approach to combining positive definite matrices is
to simply multiply them. Here, that means we would construct positive definite
matrices for the effect of each demographic on each individual and multiply all
of an individual’s matrices to obtain their final salience matrix. Unfortunately,
if the eigenvectors of all of these matrices are not identical, the second and later
demographic variables are effectively operating on a rotated version of the ideal
point space rather than simply a scaled one. At the extreme, if the demographic
matrices have multiplied together to rotate the space significantly, a demographic
that appears to increase salience on one axis—for example, a diagonal matrix with
a value of 2 at (1, 1) and 1 on the rest—may actually be increasing the salience of
a completely different axis.
The order invariance, eigenvector variation, increase/decrease, and ‘zero’ pa-
rameter properties are all simple to satisfy if we can just operate on the space of
real symmetric matrices rather than positive definite ones. If we can aggregate the
demographic effects in a symmetric matrix space and transform that into a space
of positive definite matrices, then we can satisfy all the desired properties fairly
easily.
Conveniently for us, the eigendecomposition-based matrix exponential gives a
straightforward transformation from real symmetric matrices to positive definite
ones. The transforms below give an straightforward and almost one-to-one map-
ping between the space of real square matrices and positive definite matrices.4 B
is a positive definite matrix, and E is its counterpart in the space of symmetric
4The mapping is one-to-one whenever B has unique eigenvalues, or when the computational
eigendecomposition method gives the same eigenvectors for QΛQ−1 as for Q exp(Λ)Q−1 where Q
is orthonormal and Λ is a diagonal matrix.
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matrices.
A = Q exp(Λ)QT
E = QΛQT (5.28)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix and [exp(Λ)]ij = exp(Λij).
This gives a natural way to aggregate the effects of different demographic vari-
ables. Each individual’s E can simply be a sum of demographic matrices weighted
by the individual’s demographic parameters—weighted sums of matrices have a
natural ‘zero’ term (the zero matrix), they are commutative, and they do not
require that the component matrices share eigenvectors.
So, given a length-v vector of demographic covariates Zs, we can use the ex-
ponential transformation to construct their salience matrix as follows. First we
draw their individual-specific noise according to some distribution over symmetric
matrices
E˜s ∼ F (5.29)
then we calculate a weighted sum of the k × k demographic parameter matrices
plus the individual-specific noise
Es = E˜s +
∑
v
Zsv · Evs (5.30)
take its eigendecomposition so that we can construct a square root matrix with
the same eigenvectors
Es = QsΛsQ
T
s (5.31)
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and finally calculate the salience matrix and its square root
As = Qs exp(Λs)Q
T
s (5.32)
Bs = Qs exp
(
1
2Λs
)
QTs (5.33)
5.1.5 Identification of salience matrices
Once the scale, rotation, and reflection of the latent space are identified by any of
numerous standard methods (see Rivers (2003) for a summary of options), all that
remains for identification is to ensure that the scale of salience in each dimension
is standardized.
In particular, multiplication of all As matrices by a positive definite matrix
can be counteracted by appropriate shifts in that λ and η terms, so we need to
pin down its scale. One way to do this is to pin down the mean of all the Es
terms, which is easy to do by centering the matrix of hierarchical predictors Z and
ensuring that Z does not include a column of constants. To aid in interpretation,
it is also helpful to scale the columns of Z to unit variance, though this is not
absolutely necessary.
5.2 Final model specification
I have discussed a variety of modeling options, but for clarity, I will write everything
down in one place here. The model uses only two latent dimensions of ideology.
y∗sq = φsBsλq + ǫsq, ǫsq ∼ Logistic(0, 1) (5.34)
ysq = 1 +
∑
j
{
y∗sq < (αq + λq ∗ ηqj)TBsλq
}
(5.35)
φs ∼ MVN(Zβφ, I) (5.36)
Bs = Qs exp(Λs)Q
T
s (5.37)
QsΛsQ
T
s = Es (5.38)
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with demographic predictors on the Es terms
Es =
∑
v
(ZsvD
v) + E˜s, (5.39)
with the following weakly informative priors. Note that E˜s and D
v are constrained
to be symmetric, so the priors below apply to only the upper triangle, and the
subdiagonal terms are constrained to the transpose of the superdiagonal terms.
˜(Es)ij ∼ Normal(0, σh) (5.40)
Dvij ∼ Normal(0, σd) (5.41)
λq ∼ MVN(0, σλI) (5.42)
αq ∼ MVN(0, σαI), (5.43)
The main alteration from the above discussion is that an ordinal logit model is used
for the final stage rather than ordinal probit. This is done to take advantage of
efficient ordinal logit code in Stan that does not have an ordinal probit counterpart,
but ordinal logit and probit are rarely very different in practice, so the change is
unlikely to be substantively important.
The normal priors over each term in the matrices E˜s and D
v are admittedly
somewhat ad hoc, but there is no literature on the distributions of logs of co-
variance matrices. In principle, I could have put a Wishart prior on exp(E˜s) and
exp(Dv), but that would have added an additional n + k eigendecompositions to
the likelihood calculation, and that would significantly slow an already computa-
tionally demanding model.5
For σ = 1, and 2 dimensions, the priors on E˜s and D
v produces matrices that,
5Another option would be to separate the priors over the correlation and marginal variance
components of the covariance matrices, which could allow the scale of the demographic’s effects
on salience to vary more while keeping the correlation components constrained. That offers more
flexibility but unfortunately still requires an additional layer of n + k eigendecompositions to
calculate the matrix logs needed by the likelihood calculation.
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when exponentiated, qualitatively approximate an Inverse Wishart distribution
with an identity scale matrix and 3 degrees of freedom, which is a fairly common
choice of prior over positive definite matrices. Smaller values of σ shrink the
resulting exp(E˜s) and exp(D
v) towards the identity matrix.
5.3 Application
I apply this model to a subset of the common content from the 2010 Cooperative
Congressional Election Survey (CCES). The CCES is an internet survey composed
of a number of ‘team’ modules from various universities and groups, plus a core
set of common questions asked to all respondents. The survey is administered by
Polimetrix on a representative sample of US voters. The full common content file
has over 50k respondents, but I use a sample of 1000 respondents from California.
I do this for two reasons: the full sample is too large for efficient computation (the
CA sample takes about a day to run, even with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo); and
so long as the data must be subsampled, it is helpful for interpretation to have a
relatively coherent political environment across the sample. California has distinct
regional politics, but there is much less variation than across the United States as
a whole.
The model is estimated in Stan (Stan Development Team, 2013a,b) from R
2.15.3 (R Core Team, 2012). Stan samples from the posterior using Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo, which speeds the estimation of this particular model by an order of
magnitude, and it includes functionality for calculating the eigendecompositions
used in this model.
5.4 Results
I run two models—one without variable salience, and a second with salience in-
cluded in the model. The first model gives a baseline for comparing how introduc-
ing salience changes the demographic effects on ideal points and the factor loadings
of survey questions.
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5.4.1 Model without salience
For the first model, I alter the specification from Section 5.2 to fix all the Bs
terms to the identity matrix. This turns it into a simple ordinal IRT model with
hierarchical predictors of ideal points.
The model was run in Stan with an iterative tuning procedure to get close to
the posterior mode before tuning the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo parameters for the
final sampling run. I ran 4 chains starting near the posterior mode for 50 tuning
iterations followed by 100 sample draws, for a total of 400 points in the posterior.
The purpose of this model is to serve as a baseline for comparison with the
salience model, so I will not deeply analyze the parameter estimates. I will highlight
a few features that will be important for comparison, though.
The factor loadings in 5.4 show that most of the questions in the survey loaded
primarily on the first latent dimension (the dimensions were rotated so that P1
had the most variation in loadings). There is still a good amount of spread along
P2, though none of the questions loaded on P2 exclusively. The dimensions are
scaled by individual-level variation in ideal points, so this scaling is partly because
the ideal points along P2 had more individual-specific variation relative to the
demographic effects.
This is somewhat visible in the graph of demographic predictors of ideal point
in Figure 5.3, where many of the demographic effects lie close to 0 on the P2
dimension. There are exceptions, and particularly for Church, Income, BAgain,
and Relig. These 4 variables along with Fem, MSing, and Educ will be discussed
in more detail later. The lack of questions along P2 makes estimation of ideal
points noisier along P2, as is clear in Figure 5.5.
5.4.2 Model with salience
The salience model was also run in Stan with an iterative tuning procedure to get
close to the posterior mode before tuning the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo parameters
for the final sampling run. I ran 4 chains starting near the posterior mode for 50
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Figure 5.3: Effects of demographic parameters on political ideal points in model
with uniform salience. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect esti-
mates (roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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Figure 5.4: Loadings of the questions on each political dimension in the model with
uniform salience. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect estimates
(roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of a sample of ideal points (posterior mean for each in-
dividual) from the model with uniform salience. The red dotted ellipse is a 95%
credible ellipse for a representative individual at the origin.
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tuning iterations followed by 100 sample draws, for a total of 400 points in the
posterior.
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Figure 5.6: Effects of demographic parameters on political ideal points in the vari-
able salience model. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect estimates
(roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
The salience model has somewhat different question loadings 5.7 than the uni-
form model. The handful of highly predictable questions high on the P1 scale are
bent downwards somewhat to load on the P2 scale as well, though the ratio in
this tail is still around 5:1 loading on P1:P2. Most of the other questions are in
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Figure 5.7: Loadings of the questions on each political dimension in the variable
salience model. Ellipses are the 40% confidence ellipse for the effect estimates
(roughly comparable to 1 standard deviation).
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generally similar positions. There are a few loadings that shift around, particularly
in questions like 24, 39, and 15 that had noisy salience estimates, but the overall
picture is very similar aside from the bend at the high end of P1.
The parameter estimates (Figure 5.6) are also generally similar to those for the
uniform model (Figure 5.3)—variables shift a bit, but none are switching directions
or moving wildly. BAgain and Relig shift a bit to the right on P1, and MSing shifts
slightly to the left, but there is very little other variation on P1. On P2, BAgain,
Relig both become even more positive, while Church moves towards 0, and Income
moves slightly more negative.
In terms of individual point estimates (Figure 5.8), the uncertainty on P1 is
similar to before, while the uncertainty on P2 decreases slightly. The figure over-
states the decrease slightly, though, since the variation in the mean P2 estimates
increases as noise decreases, and so the scale of the P2 axis in Figure 5.8 is slightly
expanded from that in Figure 5.5. The decrease is still there, it is just not quite
so large as the figure makes it appear.
Now that we have seen that the changes to the latent space are relatively
mild—demographic effects and question loadings are not wildly different from the
previous model—we can move into the meat of the salience model: the demo-
graphic effects on salience, examples of individual salience ellipses and noise, and
fitted indifference curves for individuals.
I visualize salience ellipses using level curves for a multivariate normal distri-
bution with the salience matrix included as its covariance term. When an ellipse is
stretched in one direction, the individual or group is impacted more by variation
along that direction, and when the ellipse is compressed in a direction, they do not
care as much about that variation. I find this more intuitive than the usual visu-
alization of centered indifference curves, though indifference curves will be helpful
when we are also visualizing individuals’ ideal points.
The demographic effects are each small on their own, but they build on each
other to produce a substantial amount of variation in individual salience estimates.
For visualization, I look at the effects of having a values of 10 on each (centered
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of a sample of ideal points (posterior mean for each indi-
vidual) from the variable salience model. The red dotted ellipse is a 95% credible
ellipse for a representative individual at the origin.
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Salience ellipses exxagerated by 10x
Figure 5.9: Salience ellipses for individuals with a value of 10 on each of the
variables and 0 on all other demographics. The demographic variables are scaled
to mean 0 and variance 1, so this extreme value is unrealistic and just helps with
visualization. The dotted unit circle provides a ‘no effect’ reference.
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and scaled) demographic variable and 0 on all other variables and compare that to
a baseline of having 0 on all variables. Exaggerating the effect by 10 is necessary so
that we can actually see variation in the ellipses. The plots show the mean ellipse
and a sample of drawn ellipses to get a sense for the estimation uncertainty in the
model. The mean ellipse is calculated by taking the pointwise average of all the log
salience matrices, and then exponentiating the resulting matrix and constructing
the ellipse.
There are a number of variables that impact the salience of P2 substantially.
Age, Fem, MWid, Rent, Income, and Kids all increase the relative importance
of P2, while Educ and Relig decrease it. The salience effects are not limited to
the primary axes, so RCath and RaceNo produce greater salience in the diagonal
(P2-P1) direction, while BAgain and NewsInt produce more relative salience on
(P1+P2). Some factors like education and income decrease overall salience, while
others like BAgain and Rent increase it.
The salience estimates are closely related to the demographic effects on ideal
points. BAgain increases salience in a roughly (P1+P2) direction, and the BAgain
ideal point effect is shifted out along this axis in the salience model compared to
the uniform model. Salience impacts how parameters move between the uniform
and salience models, but it is not strictly connected to the actual parameters.
One of the more interesting effects of salience occurs when the ideal point
parameter and axes of the salience ellipse are roughly 45◦. In party strategy
models, this allows a candidate to capture more of a certain group by moving
perpendicular to the group’s ideal point. We see roughly this pattern for Relig.
Relig shifts ideal points in a (P1+P2) direction, but it increases salience only
along P1. So more religious people are in the upper right of the latent space, but
care about movement along P1. A candidate at the origin could then boost their
support among religious people by shifting slightly downwards to the right, which
is closer along P1, but not closer in the latent space overall.
Similar effects can occur on cross terms, for example, between RCAth and
Fem, where the salience impact of RCath and the ideal point impact of Fem are
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neither parallel nor perpendicular. A campaign trying to target religious voters
might want to tune their messages differently for males and females, since religious
males and females can be swayed by different shifts. This is a huge simplification,
as there are many other variables to consider, but it shows the utility of modeling
salience at a group level.
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Figure 5.10: Example individual-specific salience noise for a sample of individuals
(gray), and multiple draws from a single individual (red). The dotted unit circle
provides a ‘no effect’ reference.
In terms of individual estimates, the model produces noisy but moderately
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Figure 5.11: Example individual salience ellipses (combination of demographic
factors and individual variation) for a sample of individuals (gray), and multiple
draws from a single individual (red). The dotted unit circle provides a ‘no effect’
reference.
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informative posteriors on the individual-specific salience noise. The red ellipses
in Figure 5.11 for ellipses drawn for a single individual are tighter together than
the thin black ellipses for a sample across individuals. Some of this is because the
red ellipses include demographic information about the individual while the black
ones are drawn from across the population, but when we strip away demographic
effects and look just at an individual’s noise term (Figure 5.10, for a different
individual), the red ellipses are still tighter together than the black ones, and so
we can estimate individual-specific variation in this model, albeit noisily.
Finally, to visualize how salience actually impacts the ideal points and indiffer-
ence curves of voters, I plot a sample of mean ideal points and mean indifference
curves—level curves for a multivariate normal distribution centered at the ideal
point with covariance equal to the inverse of the salience matrix. The key result is
that we see a substantial amount of variation in the salience across the population.
Some of the ellipses are much larger than others, some are nearly circular while
others are highly stretched, and throughout the distribution of ideal points, we see
variation in salience. Individuals who have similar ideal points may still behave
quite differently as a result of their salience differences.
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Figure 5.12: Mean ideal points and indifference curves for a sample of individuals
from the variable salience model
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5.5 Conclusions
The technique developed here offers a way to simultaneously estimate ideal points
and salience on multiple dimensions from the types of survey data that we com-
monly have in political science, and in doing so, it opens up a new set of modeling
options for researchers, particularly those doing experimental work related to po-
litical ideology.
Estimates of ideal points and salience can be input directly into formal models
to understand where parties should be moving in order to maximize votes, or the
demographic parameters can be used to simulate possible distributions of ideal
points and salience independent of the pecularities of the survey sample used for
estimation. This method provides the necessary inputs for actually testing formal
models of party strategy under heterogeneous salience, and if the models survive
the test, for making new predictions of party and voter behavior.
Thanks to the hierarchical design, researchers can include treatment variables
in the model and estimate their impact on broad ideological dimensions rather than
examining single issues in isolation or constructing ad-hoc scales that vary from
paper to paper and lab to lab. They can examine how treatments change salience
over broad dimensions like social or economic policies as a whole, rather than
just looking at how direct manipulations on a specific dimension change specific
outcomes.
In the world of political campaigns, changing how a voter thinks about an issue
is sometimes easier than changing what they think about it—adjusting salience is
easier than shifting an ideal point—and this method provides a way for campaigns
and parties to test how their messages are impacting not only preferences, but how
people translate those preferences into specific political choices.
Similarly, it is very likely that some biological and social factors operate by
not directly altering preferences, but by changing what factors we consider: how
likely we are to remember empathizing with a homeless person when voting on
a tax increase to fund shelters, or instead to remember how the city’s money
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was wasted the last time we increased taxes. Those are impacts on salience, not
direct impacts on preferences, and thus hierarchical estimation of salience makes it
possible to understand what individual characteristics, genes, physiological factors,
or experimental treatments lead people to care about certain issue dimensions. In
looser terms, it helps us figure out why people think about politics differently from
one another.
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Appendix A
CCES political questions
Questions that begin with ‘CC3. . . ’ were asked before the 2010 election, and
those that start with ‘CC4. . . ’ were asked after. Questions CC322 and CC414
were split into binary variables that denoted whether respondents selected each
option. Questions CC328 and CC329 were recoded into three variables to denote
whether defense, domestic, or tax solutions were the best, middle, or worst options.
CC320 In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of firearms
should be made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are?
• More Strict
• Kept As They Are
• Less Strict
CC321 From what you know about global climate change or global warming,
which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?
• Global climate change has been established as a serious problem, and
immediate action is necessary.
• There is enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some
action should be taken.
• We don’t know enough about global climate change, and more research
is necessary before we take any actions.
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• Concern about global climate change is exaggerated. No action is nec-
essary.
• Global climate change is not occurring; this is not a real issue.
CC322 What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigra-
tion? Select all that apply.
• Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid
taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
• Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.
• Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country ille-
gally.
CC324 Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view
on abortion?
• By law, abortion should never be permitted
• The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the
woman’s life is in danger
• The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or
danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has
been clearly established
• By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a
matter of personal choice
CC325 Some people think it is important to protect the environment even if
it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living. Other people
think that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining
jobs and our standard of living. Which is closer to the way you feel, or
haven’t you thought much about this?
• Much more important to protect environment even if lose jobs and lower
standard of living
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• Environment somewhat more important
• About the same
• Economy somewhat more important
• Much more important to protect jobs, even if environment worse
CC326 Do you support a Constitutional Amendment banning Gay Mar-
riage?
• Yes
• No
CC327 Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in
employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimina-
tion. Do you support or oppose affirmative action?
• Strongly support
• Somewhat support
• Somewhat oppose
• Strongly oppose
CC328 The federal budget deficit is approximately $600 billion this year. If
the Congress were to balance the budget it would have to consider cutting
defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social
Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. What would you most prefer
that Congress do - cut domestic spending, cut defense spending, or raise
taxes?
• Cut Defense Spending
• Cut Domestic Spending
• Raise Taxes
CC329 What do you least want Congress to do?
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• Cut Defense Spending
• Cut Domestic Spending
• Raise Taxes
CC332A Congress considered many important bills over the past two years.
For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation
in principle. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act–Authorizes $787
billion in federal spending to stimulate economic growth in the US.
• Support
• Oppose
CC332B State Children’s Health Insurance Program–Program insures chil-
dren in low income households. Act would renew the program through 2014
and include 4 million additional children.
• Support
• Oppose
CC332C American Clean Energy and Security Act–Imposes a cap on carbon
emissions and allow companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions.
Funds research on renewable energy.
• Support
• Oppose
CC332D Comprehensive Health Reform Act–Requires all Americans to ob-
tain health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health
insurance option for those without coverage. Increases taxes on those making
more than $280,000 a year.
• Support
• Oppose
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CC332E Appoint Elena Kagan to the US Supreme Court
• Support
• Oppose
CC332F Financial Reform Bill–Protects consumers against abusive lending.
Regulates high risk investments known as derivatives. Allow government to
shut down failing financial institutions.
• Support
• Oppose
CC332G End Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell–Would allow gays to serve openly in
the armed services.
• Support
• Oppose
CC332I Embryonic Stem Cell Research–Allow federal funding of embryonic
stem cell research.
• Support
• Oppose
CC414 Would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops in order to. . . ?
(Please check all that apply)
• Ensure the supply of oil
• Destroy a terrorist camp
• Intervene in a region where there is genocide or a civil war
• Assist the spread of democracy ? Protect American allies under attack
by foreign nations
• Help the United Nations uphold international law
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CC422a The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prej-
udice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any
special favors.
• Strongly agree
• Somewhat agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Somewhat disagree
• Strongly disagree
CC422b Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions
that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
• Strongly agree
• Somewhat agree
• Neither agree nor disagree
• Somewhat disagree
• Strongly disagree
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Appendix B
Proofs related to salience models
B.1 Equivalence of traditional and hyperplane-based
constructions
The two model constructions for ordinal IRT with multiple latent dimensions are
• Traditional
y∗ = φλ+ ǫ, ǫ ∼ Normal(0, 1) (B.1)
y = 1 +
∑
j
{y∗ < ηj} (B.2)
• Hyperplane-based
y∗ =
(
φ+
ǫ
‖λ‖
)
λ, ǫ ∼ MVN(0, I) (B.3)
y = 1 +
∑
j
{y∗ < ηj} (B.4)
In B.3, note that variation in ǫ perpendicular to λ has no impact on y∗. Since
the distribution of ǫ is spherical, we can rotate it into a space that has λ/‖λ‖ as
the first basis vector, call the rotated variable ǫ′, and just look at the marginal
distribution along that λ/‖λ‖ dimension. The transformed mean and variance
of ǫ′ are still 0 and I, and since the marginal distribution of any dimension of a
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standard multivariate normal is simply a standard normal, so the distribution of
ǫ′ · λ‖λ‖ is Normal(0, 1), and so if we define a final variable ǫ′′ = ǫ′ · λ‖λ‖ , that is
equivalent to the ǫ term in B.1.
B.2 Choice model invariance to perpendicular shifts
under uniform salience
We begin with a spatial choice model parameterized in terms of outcome policy
positions with ideal point φ, question direction vector λ, question- and individual-
specific noise ǫ, individual-specific salience matrix A, and cutpoints ζ.
y∗ =
(
φ+ α+
ǫ
‖λ‖
)
λ, ǫ ∼ MVN(0, I) (B.5)
y = 1 +
∑
j
{y∗ < ηj} (B.6)
and without loss of generality, assume that α · λ = 0 so that α captures shifts
perpendicular to the question direction vector.
Since αλ = 0, the manipulations to B.5 that make α disappear are trivial.
y∗ = φλ+ αλ+
ǫλ
‖λ‖ (B.7)
= φλ+
ǫλ
‖λ‖ (B.8)
=
(
φ+
ǫ
‖λ‖
)
λ (B.9)
And so the distribution of observable outcomes y conditional on φ and λ are
not affected by shifts in φ perpendicular to λ.
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